Recent Reform of Social Security Adjudication in Great Britain by Bradley, A. W.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Recent Reform of Social Security Adjudication in Great Britain"
 
A. W. Bradley
Les Cahiers de droit, vol. 26, n° 2, 1985, p. 403-449.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/042670ar
DOI: 10.7202/042670ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 13 février 2017 12:51
Recent Reform of Social Security Adjudication 
in Great Britain 
A.W. BRADLEY * 
Cet article expose les transformations qu'a subies en 1984 le système des 
tribunaux administratifs de la sécurité sociale en Grande-Bretagne. 
Ce système avait jusqu'alors comme caractéristique principale la réparti-
tion du contentieux des prestations de sécurité sociale entre deux réseaux de 
tribunaux locaux. Les uns étaient chargés d'entendre les appels relatifs aux 
prestations, pour la plupart contributives, prévues par le Social Security Act 
1975, tandis que les autres avaient compétence en matière d'aide sociale 
(supplementary benefits,). 
L'élément majeur de la réforme de 1984 est la fusion de ces deux réseaux. 
Les nouveaux tribunaux locaux de la sécurité sociale se distinguent de leurs 
prédécesseurs par leur composition : ils seront obligatoirement présidés par un 
juriste, exerçant cette fonction à temps partiel mais encadré au niveau national 
et régional par un état-major permanent constitué d'un juge et d'avocats; les 
autres membres ne seront plus désignés selon le système paritaire syndicats-
patronat qui avait traditionnellement prévalu en matière d'assurances sociales. 
Le renforcement de la présence des juristes prolonge l'évolution amorcée par les 
réformes antérieures du régime d'aide sociale. Celles-ci favorisaient à la fois la 
judiciarisation de la procédure et la réduction du pouvoir discrétionnaire de 
l'administration par le développement de la réglementation. L'unification des 
tribunaux administratifs avait également été amorcée dès 1980, par l'attribution 
aux Social Security Commissioners de la compétence de dernier ressort 
relativement à la plupart des prestations sociales. 
L'auteur commente cette réforme en fonction des objectifs qu'elle prétend 
servir : la qualité des décisions, l'indépendance des juridictions, ïaccessibilité 
d'une instance d'appel unique, la rapidité des décisions. Il fait observer que la 
réforme n'a rien fait pour simplifier et assouplir la procédure, ou pour rendre 
l'aide juridique accessible aux prestataires. Il note que les tribunaux adminis-
tratifs spécialisés chargés du contentieux médical de la sécurité sociale n'ont 
pas été visés par la réforme, en dépit de la contestation dont ils font l'objet, et 
que l'aide au logement échappe également à la compétence des tribunaux de la 
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sécurité sociale. Enfin, il fait valoir que le développement de l'encadrement 
réglementaire des prestations de sécurité sociale ne garantit en rien ni la 
rapidité du processus juridictionnel, ni la qualité des rapports entre décideurs et 
prestataires; par ailleurs, il accroît le contrôle du gouvernement sur la mise en 
oeuvre de sa politique sociale. 
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Introduction 
More than forty years after publication of the Beveridge Report on 
Social Insurance and Allied Services in 1942, the welfare state in Britain is 
under greater pressure than at any time during this period. With unemploy-
ment at over three million, an increasing number of elderly pensioners and 
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single parent families, and a government committed to cutting back the 
public sector, social security is seen in some quarters as an undue burden 
upon the taxpayer and on the machinery of government. The total costs are 
indeed vast. In 1985-1986, expenditure on social security, the most expensive 
head of government spending, will be £40 billion, about 30% of total public 
expenditure of £132 billion. This expenditure may be compared with the 
next most expensive items : defence (£18 billion), health and personal social 
services (£16.5 billion), and education and science (£13.6 billion). Although 
the Conservative government is endeavouring to cut back public expenditure 
in general, a marked increase in social security expenditure seems probable 
by 1987-1988 '. Early in 1985, the government was expected to announce its 
conclusions about the reform of the social security system, reached after a 
series of policy reviews led by ministers between 1983 and 1985. These 
reviews considered not merely the overall scale of the problem, but also the 
anomalies and defects that had developed in the scheme. For example, 
because of prevailing thresholds for paying income tax and social security 
contributions, many families with low incomes were paying tax and social 
security contributions at the same time as they qualified for supplementation 
of income from the state.2 
What is an immense burden seen by taxpayers or the government from a 
certain political perspective is the reverse of burdensome for millions in 
Britain who look for all or part of their income to social security. Thus about 
half of all social security expenditure in 1985-1986 will go to those who are 
over retirement age. Child benefit is a universal benefit payable to over 
7 million families. Over half a million single parent families receive the 
additional one-parent supplement. The family income of over 200,000 low 
wage earners is increased by family income supplement, and many more are 
eligible to apply. Of the 2.9 million unemployed claimants registered in 
November 1983, 1.6 million were solely dependant on supplementary benefit 
and 684,000 were receiving unemployment benefit alone; another 221,000 
were receiving supplementary benefit in addition to unemployment benefit. 
In February 1983, 4.3 million assessment units (families or single adults) 
were in regular receipt of supplementary benefit3. Opinions may differ about 
the case for universal benefits, but in the light of such figures, and of the 
1. The Government's Expenditure Plans, 1985-86 to 1987-88, Cond. 9428, 1985. 
2. For the inter-relation between income tax and social security, see H. PARKER, The Moral 
Hazard of Social Benefits, London, The Institute of Economic Affairs, No. 37, 1982. And 
see A.W. DILNOT, J.A. KAY and C.N. MORRIS, The Reform of Social Security, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1984. 
3. Social Security Statistics 1984 (H.M.S.O.). 
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accounts published of the effects of economic deprivation4, it is impossible 
to accept that social scientists are responsible for having redefined poverty, 
rather than for having rediscovered its existence.5 
Since no practice of federalism exists currently in Great Britain6, the 
British scheme of income maintenance is administered by the Department of 
Health and Social Security (hereafter DHSS), in cooperation with the 
Department of Employment over unemployment benefit, and with the 
Inland Revenue in the collection of social security contributions. Thus 
policy-making and administration are in the hands of large government 
departments each with its own centralised hierarchy of control ; and there is 
little direct involvement in the social security system on the part of local 
authorities. Efforts have been made under the Conservative government to 
trim down the administrative burden by reducing the number of civil 
servants. Thus, by a policy, which proved to be an organisational disaster, 
the government introduced in 1982 a new form of housing benefit admi-
nistered by local authorities instead of by the DHSS7. Since 1983, statutory 
sick pay has been paid by employers in place of sickness benefit for the first 
eight weeks of an employee's illness, and this is shortly to be extended to the 
first 28 weeks8. The DHSS also plans to make full use of the new 
information and communications technology in drawing up an operational 
strategy for the future and seeking to improve the quality of service to the 
public — for example, by establishing compatible computer systems for tax 
and social security purposes, and by achieving the "one office" approach for 
the unemployed9. Critics of the present scheme have argued strongly for a 
strategy of seeking to take advantage of improved technology in storing, 
communicating and handling information, while concentrating staff resources 
on "the kinds of job that humans will always do better than computers — 
making judgments and dispensing help and advice to claimants and tax-
payers".10 
4. E.g. P. TOWNSEND, Poverty in the United Kingdom, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1979. 
5. But the definition of poverty is far from settled: see D. PIACHAUD, New Society, 10 
September 1981, 419 and ensuing correspondence. 
6. The schemes of devolution proposed for Scotland and Wales in 1978 did not extend to 
social security (e.g. Scotland Aci 1978, sch. 10, part II, item 2; and cf. sch. 10, part I 
groups 2 and 4). In Northern Ireland, a separate administrative structure exists even under 
direct rule, but the policies followed are essentially uniform with those applying in Great 
Britain. 
7. Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982, part II. For criticism of the scheme by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General, see H.C. 638 (1983-84) and 6lh report by the Public 
Accounts Committee, 1984-85 (H.C. 78). 
8. Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982, part I ; Social Security Bill 1985. 
9. Social Security Operational Strategy — a Framework for the Future, DHSS, 1982. 
10. A.W. DILNOT, J.A. KAY and C.N. MORRIS, supra, note 2, p. 80; see also p. 3 and 46. 
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In comparison with the broad strategic considerations on which the 
future of the social security system depends, the procedure for handling 
disputes that arise out of the scheme may seem insignificant and peripheral. 
The best statistical examples of this arise in relation to the universal benefits 
such as retirement pension (see Annex A). In 1983, 9 million retirement 
pensions were in payment, over 400,000 being paid for the first time in that 
year : yet there were only 900 appeals from the decisions of officials awarding 
retirement pension. Child benefit is paid for nearly 13 million children, but 
in 1983 there were under 1,000 appeals. Compared with retirement pensions 
and child benefit, eligibility for unemployment benefit is often more difficult 
to determine; but in 1983 when there were over 5 million new claims for 
unemployment benefit, there were just under 17,000 appeals to local 
tribunals. The figures for attendance allowance tell a different story : out of 
over 207,000 claims, 48,000 were initially rejected ; 30,000 of these rejections 
were taken further to review, and 20,000 of the claims succeeded at that 
stage. In supplementary benefits, over 6 million claims were received : of 
these about 1.7 million claims were refused or withdrawn ; only some 56,000 
decisions were made by appeal tribunals. It thus appears that the proportion 
of decisions that are taken to review or appeal varies a great deal according 
to the benefit in question. (To make the same point in a different way, the 
ratio of appeals to claims in the case of death grant is 1 to 14,853 ; in the case 
of maternity benefits, it is 1 to 2,111 ; in the case of retirement pensions, 1 to 
467; in the case of industrial injury benefit, 1 to 152; in the case of 
supplementary benefit, 1 to 108 ; in the case of attendance allowance, 1 to 6. 
The ratio of appeals to claims that are initially unsuccessful is in the case of 
supplementary benefit, 1 to 30.7; in the case of attendance allowance, 1 to 
1.6.) The total number of appeals also varies from year to year (see annex B), 
but within the range of variation the total is still a small proportion of the 
total number of individual decisions made within the scheme as a whole. 
Professor Mashaw has suggested that the principal values which 
decision-making in a mass social security system must foster are accuracy, 
consistency, fairness and timeliness ". Experience both in the United States 
and in Great Britain indicates that the process of appealing is "highly and 
mysteriously selective" 12 and it is not known why some dissatisfied claimants 
appeal and many others do not. Whether or not most claims are decided 
11. J.L. MASHAW et ai, Social Security Hearings and Appeals, Lexington (Mass.), Lexington 
Books, 1978, p. xix-xxiii. And see J.L. MASHAW, "The Management Side of Due 
Process", (1974) 59 Cornell L.R. 772; and J.L. MASH AW, Bureaucratic Justice, New Haven, 
Yale H.P., 1983. 
12. J.L. MASHAW, "The Management Side of Due Process", (1974) 59 Cornell L.R. 772, 
p. 784. 
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correctly at the outset, the appeals system would break down unless most 
decisions were acceptable to the claimants most of the time. 
Yet inevitably mistakes are made, failures of communication occur, 
complex rules are misunderstood, the interaction of different benefits is 
unforeseen, the significance of crucial events is not appreciated, individual 
expectations are disappointed, citizens and officials attempt to cut corners — 
and the consequent dispute has somehow to be resolved. One form of 
constitutional protection against incompetent or sub-standard administration 
in Britain lies in the responsibility owed to parliament by departmental 
ministers. This traditional means of accountability has possibly more 
weaknesses than strengths : but the means available to the Westminster 
parliament have been strengthened since 1967 through the office of the 
Ombudsman, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration. Every 
year the British Ombudsman receives more complaints about the DHSS and 
the Inland Revenue than about other government departments, and many 
are held to be justified 13. But even on a statistical basis the Ombudsman is 
far less important as a means of protecting the citizen's rights in social 
security than is the system of appeal tribunals M. The British Ombudsman's 
role is also limited since by law he is confined to dealing with complaints of 
injustice caused by maladministration, and may not criticise the merits of 
discretionary decisions '5, whereas in the social security system the right of 
appeal against a prior administrative decision generally extends to all aspects 
of the decision, both on the facts and on the law. 
Tribunals have been a feature of the British social security scheme since 
unemployment insurance was introduced in 1911 '6. Because of this, the 
courts have traditionally made only a small contribution to developing the 
law of social security. In 1982, an English court was required for the first 
time to interpret a key phrase in unemployment benefit law (the dis-
qualification that arises when a person voluntarily leaves his employment 
"without just cause") that has been part of the law since 1911 ". In 1977 and 
13. See e.g. P.C.A.'s Annual Report for 1982 (1982-83, H.C. 257): 243 complaints against 
DHSS, 84 accepted for investigation : 26 upheld, 34 some criticism of department. The 
Inland Revenue takes second place to DHSS in the number of complaints received. 
14. Cf. G. GANZ, "The Role of the Ombudsman in Welfare Law", in (ed.) M. PARTINGTON 
and J. JOWELL, Welfare Law and Policy : Studies in Teaching. Practice and Research, 
London, Frances Pinter, 1979, p. 117-129 and A.W. BRADLEY, "The Role of the 
Ombudsman in relation to the Protection of Citizens' Rights", [1980] Camb. L..L 304, 
p. 308. 
15. Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, s. 12(3). 
16. National Insurance Act 1911, ss. 88-90, and see .1. FULBROOK, Administrative Justice and the 
Unemployed, London, Mansell, 1978, ch. 6. For an earlier study, see W.A. ROBSON, Justice 
and Administrative Law, 2nd edn., London, Stevens, 1947, p. 164-173. 
17. Crewe v. Social Security Commissioner, [1982] 2 All E.R. 745. 
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1978, the Scottish courts had to rule on what it means to have a "direct 
interest" in a trade dispute, an issue that had not previously arisen before a 
British court '8, and which reached the House of Lords for the first time only 
in 1983." 
It was probably this ability of the social security system to function 
without constant recourse to the courts that misled Sir Leslie Scarman, as he 
then was, in 1974. In his much-publicised Hamlyn Lectures, English Law — 
the New Dimension, he commented that social security was so far removed 
from the practice of the law that very few lawyers had any but the haziest 
idea of its nature and content, there being "an almost total divorce" between 
the law and the social security system : "Why should entitlement necessarily 
be as the administrator interprets i t?"2 0 . Within fourteen months he had 
revised his views, saying of the tribunal system for contributory benefits : 
An admirable legal system culminating in the National Insurance Commis-
sioners has been devised to make certain that recipients get their rights. 
Whatever criticisms one is tempted to make of national insurance, absence of 
legal control is not one... There is emerging a healthy jurisprudence based upon 
a theory of rights obtained by contributions duly paid.2I 
As the rhetorical question asked by Scarman in 1974 indicated, within a 
scheme of social insurance decisions awarding benefit are not arbitrary but 
must be based upon rules. This is so whether the scheme is interpreted as a 
legal or an administrative phenomenon. Beveridge's insight in recommending 
in 1942 a universal scheme for social insurance administered by a single 
government department made it possible for something approaching a 
universal scheme for adjudicating disputed questions to be created when the 
social security system was reconstructed under the influence of the Beveridge 
report after 194522. The main scheme of appeals for contributory benefit set 
up in 1946 was modelled upon the three-tier structure of insurance officer, 
local court of referees and umpire established in 1911 for deciding unemploy-
ment insurance questions 2 \ Beveridge was convinced that individuals had a 
18. Walt v. Lord Advocate, 1979 S.C. 120. 
19. Presho v. Insurance Officer, [1984] 1 All E.R. 97. 
20. L. SCARMAN, English Law — The New Dimension, London, Stevens, 1974, p. 35, 37, 39. 
21. Lord SCARMAN, Upjohn Lecture, January 1976, quoted in R. MICKXETHWAIT, The 
National Insurance Commissioners, London, Stevens, 1976, p. 138-139. 
22. The reality fell short of this : thus industrial injuries adjudication was kept legislatively 
separate from adjudication on contributory benefits generally, and there was a different 
structure for family allowance appeals until 1959 : see Report of Committee on Adminis-
trative Tribunals and Enquiries (Franks Report), Cond. 2J"8, 1957, paras. 177 and 184. 
23. The working of this structure had been examined in the Report of the Committee on 
Ministers' Powers, Cond. 4060, 1932, and by other official committees : see W.A. ROBSON, 
supra, note 16, p. 179-180. 
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right to benefit in return for their contributions. Without discussing the 
matter in detail, he recommended the continued existence of tribunals on the 
1911 model, subject to special arrangements being made for deciding 
industrial disablement questions. He condemned as totally unsatisfactory 
the recourse to litigation and the courts that had been such an expensive 
feature of the workmen's compensation scheme.24 
It was implicit in Beveridge's idea of rights under social insurance that 
they should not be dependent on official discretion. This was to be one of the 
critical distinctions between social insurance and social assistance. For 
Beveridge, the function of social assistance was to provide a safety-net for 
those whose needs were not met by social insurance, and who would 
diminish in number as universal social insurance came into operation. Such 
a safety-net was by definition non-contributory and Beveridge declared that 
the assistance it gave "must be felt to be something less desirable than 
insurance benefit — otherwise the insured persons get nothing for their 
contributions" ; fortunately the work of the Assistance Board showed that 
"assistance subject to a means test can be administered with sympathetic 
justice and discretion taking full account of individual circumstances".25 
The scheme of national assistance created in 1948 followed the pattern 
set by the previous scheme of unemployment assistance, and provided for a 
right of appeal to a local tribunal from official decisions, but the initial 
thinking behind this had been more to protect the system of unemployment 
assistance against political attack, rather than to protect individual rights26. 
In consequence, until recent reforms the British scheme of adjudication in 
social assistance (national assistance until 1966, thereafter supplementary 
benefits) was different from, and often seemed inferior to, the system of 
adjudication that operated in social insurance. The distinction manifested 
itself in many ways, but the cumulative effect was to diminish the procedural 
rights of the claimant for social assistance. Thus early in the 1970s the system 
of supplementary benefit appeals was conducted with very little input from 
the legal profession ; there was no right of appeal from the local tribunals ; 
and there was effectively no scope for the doctrine of precedent to operate. It 
was this form of adjudication that Lord Scarman had in mind in the passage 
quoted above from his Hamlyn lectures in 1974. When the welfare rights 
24. Beveridge Report, Cond. 6404 (1942) p. 37-39, 101-103, 148. 
25. Beveridge Report, p. 141 and 12. 
26. See T. LYNES, in (ed. M. ADLER and A.W. BRADLEY), Justice. Discretion and Poverty, 
London, Professional Books, 1975, ch. 2; and T. PROSSER, "Poverty, Ideology and 
Legality : Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals and their Predecessors", (1977) ABr. J. 
of Law and Society 39. 
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movement began to grow in the early 1970s, it was these features of social 
assistance adjudication that generated the most criticism since, for reasons 
going back to the Beveridge report, the system of appeals for contributory 
benefits had a stronger and more elaborate structure that could protect the 
rights of claimants against arbitrary decisions by DHSS officials. 
Legislation integrating these two main branches of social security 
adjudication came into effect in 1984. It had been preceded in 1977-1984 by 
a variety of other changes in the system of appeals. The object of the present 
article is to outline the various changes to that system, up to and including 
the process of integration in 1984, and to suggest some questions concerning 
the reformed system which are not yet answered. 
We will look first at adjudication under the Social Security Act 1975, 
which is the principal authority for most forms of social security benefit (all 
the benefits mentioned in annex A, except for child benefit, one parent 
benefit, supplementary benefit, and family income supplement) ; then at 
adjudication under the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976 (and the Family 
Income Supplements Act 1970) ; and finally at the recent reforms which have 
brought about a more closely integrated structure of social security appeals. 
1. Adjudication under the Social Security Act 1975 (before 1984) 
1.1. The three-tier structure 
Until the reforms of 1983-84, the principal machinery for the adjudi-
cation of disputes arising under the Social Security Act 1975 took the form of 
a three-tier structure comprising (a) the insurance officer, (b) the national 
insurance local tribunal, and (c) the Social Security Commissioners27. 
Outside this three-tier structure lay matters which the Act assigned for 
adjudication by other procedures (notably questions kept for decision by the 
Secretary of State, disablement questions relating mainly to industrial 
accidents and diseases, and claims for attendance allowance)28. Since the 
effect of the reforms in 1983-84 has been to retain this three-tier structure, 
albeit with modifications, it is worthwhile to look briefly at some aspects of 
the earlier system. 
27. See Part III of the 7975 Act and the Social Security (Determination of Claims and 
Questions) Regns., 1975/558. See also A.I. OGUS and E.M. BARENDT, The Law of Social 
Security, 2nd edn., London, Butterworths, 1982, ch. 15 and H. CALVERT, Social Security 
Law, 2nd edn., London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1978, ch. 13. 
28. See below, text for notes 54-65. 
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1.1.1. The insurance officer 
The insurance officer was an officer of the DHSS or (in respect of 
unemployment benefit) the Department of Employment, authorised to make 
or withhold awards of benefit on his own responsibility in accordance with 
the law. Usually the insurance officer would serve in a local office, but 
decisions on certain benefits (for example, child benefit and non-contributory 
invalidity pension for housewives) were made centrally by insurance officers 
working at the administrative headquarters of the relevant scheme. Elsewhere 
I have written, "the insurance officer is an adjudicating animal who is so well 
camouflaged within his natural habitat that he is easily mistaken by the 
uninitiated for an administrative or executive official" 29, but the scheme of 
designating insurance officers did help to emphasise that benefit decisions 
must be based on law rather than on administrative policy or political 
dictates. It also meant that there was no direct ministerial responsibility for 
these first instance decisions, so a dissatisfied claimant was required to 
appeal to a tribunal from the officer's decision and not seek political redress. 
The position of the insurance officer was thus like that of a tax inspector, 
authorised in his own right by law to impose or approve a tax assessment.30 
In many routine matters, the insurance officer's imprimatur might be no 
more than a rubber stamp applied to a whole batch of claims, or a single 
signature applied to a long computer print-out. But, to take the example of a 
new claim for unemployment benefit, where entitlement might be in 
jeopardy because the claimant had walked out of his previous job for no 
good reason, the insurance officer might require a series of written statements 
to be obtained from the claimant and the former employers before the 
decision is made. So too, in a case of special hardship allowance where a 
disablement resulting from an industrial accident had caused a loss of 
earning power, it might take a long time before adequate documentary 
information was obtained to enable a decision to be taken. Once a decision 
was made and an individual appealed against it, the insurance officer had to 
assemble the papers to go to the local tribunal; these would include a 
summary of the facts, a full submission of reasons for the decision including 
the relevant statutory rules and case-law, and copies of evidentiary material. 
The insurance officer's decision was always based solely on written material : 
where the material available to him revealed a conflict of fact or opinion 
which could not be resolved, the insurance officer could make use of his 
power to refer the matter to a local tribunal for decision. Basic as the 
insurance officer's role was to the structure of adjudication, very little was 
29. A. W. BRADLEY, infra, note 67, p. 115. 
30. Taxes Management Act 1970, ss. 1(2) and 29(1). 
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known outside the department about it. While the insurance officer was 
required by law to take decisions in his own name, in practice he was trained 
and guided in his work by senior insurance officers acting at a regional or 
national level. 
1.1.2. The national insurance local tribunal 
The second tier was the national insurance local tribunal, which before 
the recent reforms sat at 178 centres throughout Great Britain. Every 
claimant had a right to appeal within 28 days to the tribunal against an 
adverse decision by the insurance officer. At a hearing, a tribunal would 
consist of three persons, the chairman (who was in practice always legally 
qualified, although this was not a statutory requirement), a lay member 
drawn from a panel representing employers and the self-employed, and a 
second lay member drawn from a panel representing employed earners 
(trade union officials or members nominated by trade union organizations). 
The chairman received a fee for each session. The lay members would receive 
only travelling expenses or compensation for loss of earnings. Up to six 
appeals were customarily heard and decided in a single session of two to 
three hours. The tribunal would receive the papers relating to the appeals 
about ten days in advance, at the same time as each appellant received his 
own set with the notice to attend. At the hearing, an additional statement 
might have been sent in by the appellant or the appellant might attend with 
any representatives, friends or witnesses whom he might bring to the 
hearing. Often the appellant did not attend the hearing ; sometimes he might 
decide to withdraw the appeal upon seeing the tribunal papers. Legal 
representation was rare. Procedure was informal and very much in the hands 
of the chairman. In 1974, a New Zealand lawyer commented on the 
proceedings, "the apparent casualness of the hearing has directed attention 
away from the formality of decision".31 
In 1970-71, research into the operation of these tribunals in Scotland 
and North England was carried out by a group from Newcastle University 
led by Professor Kathleen Bell32. One conclusion reached, based on the 
widely differing percentages of successful appeals as between different 
tribunals, was that despite the statutorily defined conditions of benefit, and 
31. J.A. FARMER, Tribunals and Government, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974, 
p. 108-109. 
32. K. BELL et al., "National Insurance Local Tribunals", (1974) 3 Jl. Social Policy 289; 
(1975) 4 7/. Social Policy 1. For other accounts of the tribunals, see H. STREET, Justice in 
the Welfare State, London, Stevens, 1968, ch. 1 and P.S. ATIYAH, Accidents, Compensation 
and the Law, 3rd edn., London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980, p. 401-407. 
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the governing case-law contained in Commissioners' decisions, these local 
tribunals were able to exercise more judicial discretion than was often 
supposed and were "engaged in an exercise which is not confined to the 
application of objective rules and standards" 33. But the implications of this 
conclusion were not explored by the Newcastle researchers, who did not 
examine the substance or value or legal difficulty of what was in issue on 
appeal, and suggested no reason why different tribunals engaged on basically 
the same exercise should produce widely varying results. Nor did the 
researchers attempt to explain why the types of cases coming before the 
tribunals they studied differed so sharply.34 
1.1.3. Social Security Commissioners 
From decisions of local tribunals, a right of appeal lay to the full-time 
body of salaried lawyers created in 1948 and known as the National 
Insurance Commissioners, and renamed Social Security Commissioners in 
198035. Persons appointed Commissioners must be barristers, advocates or 
solicitors of ten years standing. Their main work formerly was to decide 
appeals from decisions of national insurance local tribunals but successive 
additions were made to their jurisdiction, notably in 1959 when a right of 
appeal on questions of law was provided to the Commissioners from 
decisions by medical appeal tribunals on disablement questions. As the 
Commissioners gained in experience in the years after 1948, they brought an 
increasingly expert and reflective judgment to bear on particular cases. The 
publication of selected decisions (and the availability of others for consulta-
tion) gave authoritative guidance in applying social security legislation to 
insurance officers and local tribunals. Their published case-law brought to 
life the dry bones of enacted rules, set standards of procedure and evidence 
for local tribunals, and enabled a judicial discretion to be exercised in the 
interpretation of phrases such as "voluntarily leaving employment without 
33. Supra, note 32, p. 310. One weakness of the analysis of the performance of different 
tribunals made at p. 306-310 is that no definition of "local tribunal" for statistical 
purposes is given. In large urban areas, it is likely that several chairmen would sit regularly 
in the same "tribunal" whereas in less populous areas, only a single chairman might be 
available. On the hypothesis that the legal chairman had the greatest single influence on 
the outcome of appeals, the analysis would have been more informative if it had been 
related not to "tribunals" but to individual chairmen. 
34. Thus amongst 25 tribunals within Scotland, 55% of all appeals in 1970 concerned 
unemployment benefit ; but at five tribunals the proportion of unemployment benefit 
appeals ranged from 94% to 78%, and at five tribunals the proportion ranged from 42% 
to 16%: BELL et ai, supra, note 32, p. 308. 
35. Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(3) and sch. 10 ; Social Security Act 1980, ss. 12, 13. And see 
R. MICKLETHWAIT, supra, note 21. 
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just cause" and "good cause" for late claims for benefit353. In cases of 
exceptional difficulty, a tribunal of three Commissioners might sit to decide 
the appeal; such decisions have greater authority than that of a single 
Commissioner.36 
Before 1980, every claimant who was dissatisfied by the decision of a 
local tribunal could appeal to the Commissioner within three months as of 
right, both on facts and law. So too could an insurance officer when the 
tribunal's decision went against him, although in practice use of this right 
was controlled by regional and national insurance officers. But this un-
restricted right of appeal was abused by some claimants and the thoroughness 
of the process of appeal at this level led to considerable delays and a 
substantial backlog of appeals. In 1980, the law was changed to allow the 
right of appeal to continue only when the local tribunal made a majority 
decision. When the local tribunal was unanimous, the case with most 
tribunal decisions, leave to appeal was thereafter required, either from the 
tribunal chairman or from a Commissioner.37 
1.1.4. Judicial review of Commissioners' decisions 
But for the Commissioners and their expertise, there would certainly 
have been much more litigation in the courts arising out of the social security 
scheme. Those who framed the three-tier system in 1946 may well have 
intended it to be self-regulating, with recourse to the courts excluded. The 
decisions of the Commissioners were stated in the 1946 legislation to be 
"final" 38, but it was established in 1957 that this meant merely that the 
decision was final on the facts, and did not exclude certiorari39. Thus 
Commissioners' decisions could be challenged in the English High Court by 
certiorari, on grounds of excess of jurisdiction, breach of natural justice, or 
error of law on the face of the record. Since the Commissioners habitually 
gave reasoned decisions, and their decisions were accompanied by docu-
mentation that could if necessary be treated as part of the record, this meant 
that where an application for certiorari went to the High Court, no 
technicalities barred the court from reviewing the soundness of the Commis-
sioner's legal reasoning. Considering the number of decisions recorded by 
35a. For analysis of the case-law on the first, see OGUS and BARENDT, supra, note 27, p. 106-118 ; 
and on the second, M. PARTINGTON, Claim in Time — A Study of the Time Limit Rules for 
Claiming Social Security Benefits, London, Frances Pinter, 1978. 
36. See Commissioner's decision R(I) 12/75. 
37. Social Security Act 1980, s. 15. It seems from the figures in annex B of national insurance 
appeals for 1979-83 that this restriction may have reduced the number of appeals. 
38. National Insurance Act 1946, s. 43(1) ; see now Social Security Act 1975, s. 117. 
39. R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, ex p. Gilmore, [1957] 1 Q.B. 574. 
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the Commissioners (well over 2,000 per year between 1960 and 1973) 
remarkably few decisions were challenged in the English High Court, less 
than 40 in all between 1948 and 1975.40 
Until 1975 virtually all these cases concerned the industrial injuries 
scheme, which is capable of giving rise to difficult mixed questions of fact 
and law and where the amount of benefit in dispute may be substantial. On 
matters of procedure, the High Court accepted that the work of the 
Commissioners departed in important respects from the adversary process of 
civil litigation and, subject only to natural justice, could adopt an inquisitorial 
or investigatory style41. But what of the substance of the law being 
administered? In 1965, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning M.R. stated 
that it would be unfortunate if the courts became too ready to detect errors 
of law in the decisions made by the Commissioners : 
This is one of those questions which, as it seems to me, the legislature has 
decided should not be brought up to the courts of law for decision, but should 
be entrusted to the specialised statutory authorities for determination. It may 
occasionally be of use, if there is a real error of law, for a case to be brought 
before this court, but not in such a case as this.42 
Subsequent cases in the High Court raised important issues of law 
concerning Commissioners' decisions outside the industrial injuries scheme. 
For example, judges defined the extent of the Commissioners'jurisdiction to 
review decisions by the Attendance Allowance Board on claims for attend-
ance allowance 4 \ held that a woman who kills henhusband may on grounds 
of public policy be disqualified from receiving widows' benefit44, and 
considered how the law of unemployment benefit applies to a redundancy 
scheme affecting the armed forces45. In the last case, Lord Denning re-
iterated that the judges should adopt a non-interventionist approach in 
reviewing decisions of the Commissioners. He said : 
If a decision of the Commissioners has remained undisturbed for a long time, 
not amended by regulation, nor challenged by certiorari, and has been acted on 
by all concerned, it should normally be regarded as binding. The High Court 
should not interfere with it save exceptional circumstances.'"' 
40. MICKI.ETHWAIT, supra, note 21, p. 124. 
41. R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex p. Moore, [1965] 1 Q.B. 456; and R. v. 
National Insurance Commissioner, ex p. Viscusi, [1974] 2 All E.R. 724. 
42. R. v. Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex p. A.E.U., [1966] 2 Q.B. 31, p. 48. 
43. R. v. National Insurance Commissioner, ex p. Secretary of State for Social Services, [1974] 3 
All E.R. 522. 
44. R. v. National Insurance Commissioner, ex p. Connor, [1981] 1 All E.R. 769. See now 
Forfeiture Act 1982 and R(G) 2/84. 
45. R. v. National Insurance Commissioner, ex p. Stratton, [1979] Q.B. 361. 
46. Stratton's case, idem, p. 369. 
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The Commissioners' jurisdiction extended to the whole of Great 
Britain, yet the law of judicial review of administrative action in Scotland is 
different from English law. Thus the prerogative orders have never been 
available in Scottish courts, although broadly equivalent remedies exist"7. In 
particular, it was formerly uncertain whether the Court of Session could 
review tribunal decisions for error of law where no excess of jurisdiction was 
involved. In Watt v. Lord Advocate, the Court of Session held that it did not 
have the power of review for error of law, although in the particular case the 
Commissioner's decision was quashed on jurisdictional grounds4 8 . Since this 
meant that social security claimants in Scotland did not have the same right 
to seek judicial review of Commissioners' decisions as in England, there was 
an evident need for legislation. In 1980, there was created a right of appeal 
on a question of law from any decision of a Commissioner (with leave of a 
Commissioner or the court) to the English Court of Appeal and to the Inner 
House of the Court of Session in Scotland; the appropriate court is to be 
specified by the Commissioner when leave to appeal is sought49 . Possibly the 
most significant aspect of this change was that appeals now go direct to the 
Court of Appeal, not to the High Court. This cut out one possible level of 
appeal and implied (rightly) that the Commissioners had greater legal 
expertise and authority than most tribunals in Britain, from whom appeal on 
law usually lies to the High Court5 0 . In the first appeal to the Court of 
Appeal under the 1980 Act, Lord Denning followed the same approach as he 
had done earlier in exercising the jurisdiction to review by certiorari, when 
he upheld a long line of decisions by the Commissioners concerning the 
definition of "just cause" for voluntarily leaving employment" . This 
approach has subsequently been endorsed by the House of Lords.52 
Although it is undesirable for any inferior tribunal to be the ultimate 
arbiter on questions of law, and the Commissioners should not be immune 
from judicial scrutiny, there are good reasons why the superior courts should 
continue to respect their expertise. One exceptional situation is where 
differences of opinion on a point exist among the Commissioners, when the 
Court of Appeal may have to resolve the matter.53 
47. See Scottish Law Commission, Remedies in Administrative Law, Memo. No. 14, 1971. 
48. 1979 S.C. 120. 
49. Social Security Act 1980, s. 14. The Commissioner's choice of the appropriate court 
depends in principle on "the premises where the authority whose decision was the subject 
of the Commissioner's decision usually exercises its functions" (s. 14(5)). 
50. Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, s. 13. 
51. Crewe v. Social Security Commissioner, [1982] 2 AU E.R. 745. 
52. Presho v. Insurance Officer, [1984] 1 All E.R. 97. 
53. See Stratton's case, supra, note 45, p. 369 and R. v. National Insurance Commissioner, ex p. 
Secretary of Stale, (1981) reported at R(A) 2/80. Another way of resolving such 
differences is for a Tribunal of Commissioners to be appointed, supra, text for note 36. 
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1.2. Other forms of adjudication under the Social Security Act 1975 
The three-tier structure described in the previous section determined all 
questions arising under the 1975 Act except where other provision was made. 
Three other procedures may be mentioned briefly. Since they have been less 
materially affected by recent reforms it may be assumed that they are 
continuing to function as described, except where it is stated to the contrary. 
1.2.1. Secretary of State's questions 
Certain questions are required by the Act to be decided by the Secretary 
of State, in particular those relating to the status of an earner and the 
category of earners in which he should be placed, questions as to an 
individual's contribution record, and questions whether a person was in the 
past excluded from employment because of home responsibilities. Before the 
decision is taken, a hearing may be held before an appointed official (usually 
a departmental lawyer) and there is provision for reference or appeal on a 
question of law to the High Court54 but there is no right of appeal on the 
merits and this can lead to the DHSS being judge in its own cause 55. The 
questions to be decided by the Secretary of State are varied from time to 
time 56. There are also other discretionary powers which are decided by the 
Secretary of State, without any procedural safeguards57. The reservation of 
certain questions to the Secretary of State excludes decision of them by the 
insurance officer, the local tribunal and the Commissioner, but the precise 
division of power to decide can be complex.58 
1.2.2. Disablement questions 
Under the industrial injuries scheme certain questions (whether the 
relevant accident resulted in a loss of faculty, and the degree and duration of 
any resulting disablement) are known as disablement questions. They were 
for many years determined first by a board of two doctors (the effect of 
recent reforms is to replace the medical board for many purposes with a 
single adjudicating medical practitioner) and then on appeal or reference by 
54. Social Security Act 1975, ss. 93-94. 
55. As in D.H.S.S. v. Walker Dean Walker Ltd., [1970] 2 Q.B. 74. 
56. E.g. Social Security and Housing Benefits Act 1982, s. 11. 
57. Social Security Act 1975, s. 95; and see e.g. references to Secretary of State in Social 
Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1979/628. 
58. R(U) 9/60 : Secretary of State to decide whether form of claim acceptable ; statutory 
authorities to decide whether document was a claim. 
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a medical appeal tribunal, consisting of a legal chairman and two doctors 59. 
Decisions of a medical appeal tribunal have since 1959 been subject to an 
appeal to the Commissioners on a point of law, with leave of the tribunal or 
a Commissioner. Failure to record adequate findings of fact and reasons for 
a decision constitutes an error of law60. These authorities also decide 
whether the medical conditions of entitlement to mobility allowance are 
satisfied61. The jurisdiction of the medical authorities is tightly drawn and 
the three-tier structure of insurance officer, local tribunal and Commissioner 
also dealt with many types of case involving medical issues, for example 
incapacity for work and entitlement to special hardship allowance. The 
division of jurisdiction between the three-tier structure and the medical 
authorities can be very complex and led on two occasions to Commissioners' 
decisions being taken to the House of Lords.62 
1.2.3. Attendance allowance 
Attendance allowance has since 1970 been payable to persons who on 
medical grounds need frequent attention or supervision throughout the day 
and/or during the night. The non-medical questions of entitlement are 
decided by the statutory authorities, but decisions on the medical conditions 
are made either by the Attendance Allowance Board, a body consisting 
mainly of medical doctors, or by individual doctors under powers delegated 
to them by the Board63. An unsuccessful applicant may within three months 
seek review by the Board of an adverse decision, and many decisions are 
revised by this procedure. Appeal from the Board lies to the Commissioners, 
but only on questions of law. The first reported Commissioner's decision on 
attendance allowance laid down the standards to be observed by the Board 
in giving reasons for decisions64, and these standards have been widely 
applied in other areas of social security. The scrutiny given by the Commis-
sioners to the Board's procedures and decisions has been valuable.65 
59. Social Security Act 1975, ss. 108-113 and sch. 12, amended by Health and Social Services 
and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, sch. 8, part VI ; infra, text for notes 144, 145. 
60. R(I) 14/75. 
61. Mobility Allowance Regulations, 1975/1573, Part IV. 
62. Minister for Social Security v. A.E.U., [1967] 1 A.C. 725 and Jones v. Secretary of State, 
[1972] A.C. 944. 
63. Social Security Act 1975, ss. 105-106; and infra, text for notes 189, 191. 
64. R(A) 1/72. 
65. D. CARSON, "The Attendance Allowance", (1975) 26 N.I.LQ. 291. 
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2. Adjudication under the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976 (before 1984) 
2.1. The need for reform 1966-1976 
The adjudication of disputes arising out of claims for social assistance in 
Britain has given rise to more controversy than the adjudication of contri-
butory benefits. The basic structure from 1966 to 1978 was that (a) decisions 
on claims for benefit were made in the name of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission, and (b) claimants had the right of appeal to a supplementary 
benefit appeals tribunal (hereafter SBAT). There was no further right of 
appeal, although an individual was free to make fresh claims whenever he 
chose. Review of SBAT decisions by the courts was a possibility that came to 
be used only gradually during the 1970s. 
Possibly because the Franks Report in 1957 regarded SBATs as 
somehow different from all other tribunals (in form adjudicatory but in 
practice resembling an assessment or case-committee)66, the post-Franks 
reforms were never fully applied to SBATs, though they were brought under 
the supervision of the Council on Tribunals. Despite the establishment of a 
statutory right to supplementary benefit in 1966, the need to reform the 
tribunals to take account of this change was not appreciated at the time. As 
pressure from the welfare rights movement increased after 1970, the SBATs 
were not capable of taking the strain. By 1975, the critics were virtually 
unanimous that reform was needed and that in many ways these tribunals 
were lacking in fairness, openness and impartiality67. In particular, the 
DHSS was forced to take note of a report on research by Professor Kathleen 
Bell, which the Department had itself commissioned. She concluded that 
there was "an unanswerable case for a comprehensive review as a matter of 
urgency"68. Based on research into tribunals in the northern region of 
England, the report found inter alia that the tribunal chairmen, who were 
mostly not lawyers, "did not fully comprehend the complexities of the 
work". Proceedings were too often "unsystematic, inconsistent and over-
influenced by sympathy or otherwise". A weak tribunal would rely too 
heavily for support upon its clerk (a departmental official) and on the official 
who presented the case for the Supplementary Benefits Commission. A large 
number of reports of tribunal proceedings was examined, "the majority of 
66. Franks Report, 1957, supra, note 22, para. 182. 
67. See M. ADLER and A.W. BRADLEY, supra, note 26, and the literature mentioned in 
A.W. BRADLEY, "Reform of Supplementary Benefit Tribunals — the Key Issues", (1976) 
27 N.I.L.Q. 96. 
68. K. BELL, Research Study on Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals: Review of Main 
Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations, H.M.S.O. 1975, p. 20. 
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which did not adequately record a reasoned decision". There was not so much 
a lack of goodwill towards claimants as a failure to follow a consistent and 
clear judicial process in their decision-making. "Overall, the tribunals had 
not evolved a disciplined and systematic approach to the exercise of 
discretion."69 
This last finding was central to the matter. The entitlement to benefit 
introduced by the Supplementary Benefits Act in 1966 was little more than 
nominal. The Act and regulations were no more than a skeletonic and 
incomplete framework for the benefits scheme. Such general rules as the 
1966 Act contained were nearly all subject to discretionary exceptions ; thus 
most general rules could be departed from when the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission as a matter of policy thought this was justified or when a 
claimant's individual circumstances might seem to an official to warrant 
this70. Decisions by officials were in fact largely based on secret administrat-
ive rules (the A-Code), the full details of which were made known neither to 
the public nor to the tribunals. Yet the Act gave the tribunals on appeal the 
power to substitute for the decision made by the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission, any decision which could lawfully have been made by the 
Commission. The tribunals, unlike the officers, were not bound by Commis-
sion policies. This open-ended system was kept within bounds only by the 
apparent reluctance of many tribunals to use their freedom to depart from 
Commission policies. A tribunal would often merely confirm that the 
Commission's decision had been correctly made in accordance with the Act, 
even though that decision might have been determined according to a policy 
that had no specific statutory base — and might indeed appear to run 
counter to the legislation.71 
In the absence of an appeal to the courts, the decisions of tribunals were 
subject at common law to judicial review on grounds of excess of jurisdiction, 
breach of natural justice and error of law. The Child Poverty Action Group 
and the Citizens' Rights Office adopted a test case strategy; by attacking 
tribunal decisions that were vulnerable to judicial review, they sought to 
force improvements in the benefits scheme. The earliest expectations of this 
strategy were not realised72. Yet in a number of instances, the court held that 
the exercise of the Commission's discretionary powers was not justified in 
69. BELL, idem, p. 13. 
70. For a fuller discussion, see BRADLEY, supra, note 67, p. 104-111. 
71. See infra, note 73. 
72. T. PROSSER, "Politics and Judicial Review : the Atkinson Case and its Aftermath", [1979] 
P.L. 59 ; and T. PROSSER, Test Cases for the Poor, London, Child Poverty Action Group, 
1983. 
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law ". Some decisions held that the rules of means-testing had not been 
correctly applied74, and others were concerned with tribunal procedure75. 
By contrast, on the first occasion that review of a tribunal's decision reached 
the Court of Appeal, the court doubted whether this territory should be 
invaded by lawyers 76 ; nor did the judges always see as problematic issues 
which in practice were highly controversial like the definition of co-
habitation 77. Even where there was success in the courts, this sometimes was 
short-lived, as amending legislation was rapidly passed n. Nonetheless these 
cases served to focus attention on actual and potential weaknesses in the 
scheme. 
2.2. The first reforms — 1977-1980 
The Bell report had in 1975 concluded that there was an unanswerable 
and urgent case for a comprehensive review of supplementary benefit 
tribunals. The report's detailed recommendations included those steps which 
could by a change in practice be introduced without delay (for example, the 
introduction of training for tribunal chairmen and members), those which 
would take a longer period to implement (for example, the appointment of 
legally qualified chairmen), and those of a structural kind which would 
require legislation, such as the provision of a second-tier appeal body and (as 
the ultimate objective) the integration of national insurance and supple-
mentary benefit appeals.79 
The government's response to the Bell report and other criticisms of the 
tribunals was made known in January 1977. They included (1) a move to 
appoint more legally qualified chairmen ; (2) the provision, by order under 
the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, of a right of appeal on law from 
SBATs to the High Court in England and the Court of Session in Scotland ; 
(3) the introduction of training for all tribunal chairmen ; (4) the preparation 
73. R. v. Greater Birmingham Tribunal, ex p. Simper, [1973] 2 All E.R. 461 ;R. v. West London 
Tribunal, ex. p. Taylor, [1975] 2 All E.R. 790 ; R. v. Barnsley Tribunal, ex p. Atkinson. [1977] 
3 All E.R. 103 ; R. v. West London Tribunal, ex. p. Wyatt, [1978] 2 All E.R. 315. 
74. Ex p. Taylor, supra, note 73 ; R. v. West London Tribunal, ex p. Clarke. [1975] 3 All E.R. 
513. 
75. R. v. South West London Tribunal, ex p. Bullen, [1976] S.B. (Supplementary Benefit 
Decisions) 59. 
76. R. v. Preston Tribunal, ex p. Moore, [1975] 2 All E.R. 807. 
77. R. v. South West London Tribunal, ex p. Barnett, [1973] S.B. 25; cf. Crake's case, infra, 
note 83. 
78. Ex p. Simper, supra, note 73; ex p. Atkinson, supra, note 73. 
79. BELL, supra, note 68, p. 20-25. 
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of a guide to tribunal procedure ; and (5) a number of other improvements, 
regarding such matters as the role of the clerk and tribunal documentation.80 
The decision to appoint more legally qualified chairmen was justified 
but there was no undue haste in its implementation. In 1977, barely 10% of 
approximately 300 SBAT chairmen in Britain were legally qualified. By 
September 1980, this had risen to 26% and by July 1982 to 36%81. A series 
often week-end training conferences for the three hundred chairmen then in 
post was held between November 1977 and September 1978. An initial 
problem had been to devise a framework which allowed the training to take 
place under the auspices of DHSS, without prejudicing the impartiality of 
the tribunals. In the event, the content of the training conferences was settled 
and the instructing staff appointed by a small committee comprising the 
author of this article, a representative of the Social Affairs Committee of the 
Trades Union Congress, and two serving SBAT chairmen. The approval of 
the DHSS as such was never sought nor given to the content of the 
programme, which covered the legal framework of supplementary benefits 
and the social background to the scheme, as well as practical problems of 
tribunal procedure and decision-making. Administrative support for the 
training conferences was provided by DHSS staff but no officials took part 
in the programme of instruction, which was provided by practising lawyers, 
serving chairmen of tribunals, and academic specialists in social security 
from the fields of law and social policy. It is inevitably difficult to assess the 
success of such a programme. But those who took part were made aware of 
the independent role of the tribunals and of the important difference 
between rules of law and Commission policies. A modified form of the 
training programme was later extended to tribunal members. 
Treatment of tribunal procedure in the training programme was assisted 
by the issue in 1977 of a fifty-page guide to procedure82. Again a problem 
had been to find a way of enabling the guide to be prepared without causing 
the DHSS to be criticised for interfering with the independence of the 
tribunals. In fact the DHSS could not avoid being responsible for the 
booklet, but the final text was approved by the independent members of an 
advisory committe and there was consultation with the Council on Tribunals. 
The guide had no legal force and it was up to individual tribunals whether or 
not to accept the advice it gave. But in due course it received some judicial 
blessing.83 
80. Hansard, H.C. Deb. 18 Jan. 1977, W.A. 664-665. See also N. HARRIS, "The Reform of 
the Supplementary Benefit Appeal System", [1983] J.S. W.L. 212. 
81. Annual Report, Council on Tribunals 1981-82, p. 30. 
82. SBATs, A guide to procedure, London, H.M.S.O., 1977. A revised edition was issued in 
1982. 
83. Crake v. S.B.C., [1982] 1 All E.R. 498, p. 506. 
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The most controversial item announced in January 1977 was the 
provision of an appeal on law direct from the tribunals to the High Court. 
The main advantage of this was that no primary legislation was needed. The 
new appeal came into operation in January 197884, despite a rearguard 
action against this within government circles, in which the DHSS, the Lord 
Chancellor's Office and the Treasury were all involved. The view of external 
critics of the proposal was that it was incongruous to go from a wholly lay 
tribunal, unaccustomed to basing its decisions on legal authority and finding 
difficulty in formulating reasons for its decisions, direct to the High Court85. 
In the event, the direct appeal to the High Court turned out to be a 
temporary expedient pending the substitution of an appeal to the Social 
Security Commissioners, as we shall see below. 
Decisions of the High Court on appeal between 1978 and 1980 did not 
in essence differ from earlier decisions given on certiorari. They enabled 
authoritative interpretations to be given of key statutory phrases86, the 
application of the cohabitation rule ("living together as husband and wife") 
to be considered87, advice to be given to tribunals about the recording of 
reasons 88 and the exercise of discretionary powers to be reviewed 89. There 
were indications that a direct appeal on points of law might lead to the court 
"being somewhat readier to intervene than when the procedure had been by 
certiorari" 90. Difficulties arose when the court wished to establish what had 
happened during the tribunal proceedings, as the record was usually 
uninformative ; the expedient was adopted of requiring the chairman's notes 
of evidence to be produced, where these existed.91 
By the Social Security Act 1979, additional legislative changes were 
made in the scheme. Authority was given for the appointment of full-time 
salaried senior chairmen, who in addition to adjudicating were to have some 
responsibility for organising tribunals in the regions assigned to them92. But 
for reasons of economy only four senior chairmen were appointed to cover 
84. Tribunals and Inquiries (Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals) Order 1977, S.I. 
1977/1735. 
85. See e.g. M. ADLER and A.W. BRADLEY, supra, note 26, ch. 15. 
86. Notably by the House of Lords in S.B.C. v. Jull, [1981] A.C. 1025. 
87. Crake v. S.B.C, supra, note 83. 
88. E.g. Crake v. S.B.C, supra, note 83; Miller v. S.B.C, [1980] S.B. 329; Imrie v. S.B.C, 
[1980] S.B. 209. 
89. E.g. S.B.C. v. Clewer, [1979] S.B. 151 ; S.B.C. v. Lamb, [1979] S.B. 183;/?. v. Manchester 
Tribunal, ex p. Crookall, [1979] S.B. 191. 
90. E.g. Clegg v. S.B.C, [1979] S.B. 199; Crake v. S.B.C, supra, note 83. 
91. E.g. Imrie v. S.B.C, [1980] S.B. 209. 
92. Social Security Act 1979, s. 6(2) and sch. 2, amending Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, 
sch. 4. 
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the whole of Britain. This was a step on the way to establishing a 
"presidential" system for the organisation of SBATs, akin to that already 
used for industrial tribunals and rent assessment committees.93 
2.3. Discretion, rights and regulations 
None of the measures adopted to meet criticism of the tribunals dealt 
with what was probably the main underlying problem, namely the legal 
structure of the benefits scheme itself. In 1971 the late Professor R.M. Titmuss 
had defended the place of discretion in the scheme and the use of 
administrative rules, attacking what he called the pathology of legalism94, 
but it had become impossible to exercise discretion flexibly and on an 
individualised basis for several million claimants. The policy rules issued by 
the Supplementary Benefits Commission often prevailed over the discretion 
of the individual officers in dealing with the personal needs of a claimant. 
But officer discretion was still extensive and, from a departmental point of 
view, it was difficult to maintain reasonably consistent use of discretionary 
powers amongst different regions and different local offices ; and in law it 
was impossible to achieve uniformity of decision by the tribunals. In a series 
of annual reports between 1975 and 1979, the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission under the vigorous leadership of Professor David Donnison 
called attention to the main issues. The Commission argued that the reliance 
on discretionary additions to the basic rates of benefit eroded public 
confidence in the scheme, since claimants did not have clearly defined rights 
to benefit ; discretionary powers were also inefficient to administer. If the 
scheme was left unchanged, discretion was liable to proliferate still further.95 
The Commission's arguments and other factors led to a large-scale 
review of the scheme by officials, whose report Social Assistance96 recom-
mended the introduction of a new structure which would set out the rules of 
the scheme fully and precisely, rather than leaving many areas open to 
interpretation and discretion. The report argued that if the legislation were 
93. R.E. WRAITH and P.G. HUTCHESSON, Administrative Tribunals, London, Allen & Unwin 
for the Royal Institute of Public Administration, 1973, p. 84-92; BELL, supra, note 68, 
p. 20; and cf. A.W. BRADLEY, supra, note 67, p. 112. 
94. R.M. TITMUSS, "Welfare 'Rights', Law and Discretion", (1971) 42 Pol. Quarterly 113. 
95. Report of S.B.C. for 1976, Cmnd. 6910, 1977,p. 11-14; and see D. DONNISON, The Politics 
of Poverty, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1982. The extensive literature on discretion is 
reviewed by D. BULL, "The Anti-Discretion Movement in Britain: Fact or Phantom?", 
[1980] J.S. W.L. 65 ; and see T. PROSSER in M. ADLER and S. ASQUITH (ed.), Discretion and 
Welfare, London, Heinemann, 1981, ch. 7. 
96. D.H.S.S., 1978. For a full history of this review, see C. WALKER, Changing Social Policy, 
the case of the supplementary benefits review, London, Bedford Square Press, 1983. 
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left unchanged, there would be increasing resort to appeal tribunals and the 
courts : 
As case-law and precedents built up, they will in practice take over much of 
the Supplementary Benefits Commission's policy-making functions. Already 
local office staff are often unsure whether the Commission's policies can and 
should be adhered to in the face of pressures from claimants' groups and 
obviously dilfferent views adopted by their local appeal tribunal. " 
The review concluded that the detailed rules of the scheme should be 
contained either in regulations or in a Code of Practice, in each case 
published and laid before Parliament. The report found the idea of a code 
attractive, since it would leave some flexibility in the scheme and could be 
drafted in plainer language than the difficult phraseology of statutory 
regulations. 
Despite much criticism of this report, particularly as it had been 
conducted on the basis of no extra cost being incurred98, the Conservative 
government decided to adopt an urgent programme of reform on the lines 
indicated in Social Assistance". The resulting legislation {Social Security Act 
1980) drastically amended the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976. The idea of 
a Code of Practice having been rejected by the government, the detailed rules 
of the scheme were thereafter to be contained in an extensive series of 
regulations made under the 1976 Act in its new form.100 
The legal effect of the changed structure can best be illustrated by 
reference to the discretionary power to make single payments to claimants 
for particular needs that could not be made out of the regular weekly 
payments. Before the changes made in 1980, the Supplementary Benefits Act 
1976, s. 3(1) provided simply : 
Where it appears to the Commission reasonable in all the circumstances they 
may determine that supplementary benefit shall be paid to a person by way of a 
single payment to meet an exceptional need. 
Millions of pounds were paid out under this power each year, for all 
manner of purposes. In 1980, this provision was altered to read : 
There shall be payable in prescribed cases, to a person who is entitled or 
would if he satisfied prescribed conditions be entitled to a supplementary 
97. Social Assistance, supra, note 96, p. 23. 
98. Response of Supplementary Benefit Commission to 'Social Assistance', H.M.S.O., 1979. 
99. Reform of the Supplementary Benefits Scheme, Cmnd. 7773, 1979 ; and see M. PARTINGTON, 
"Rules and Discretion in British Social Security Law", in In Memoriam, Sir Otto Kahn-
Freund, Munich, 1980, p. 619. 
100. For comment, see C. HARLOW, (1981) 44 M.L.R. 546, R. LISTER, [1980] J.S.W.L. 341, 
D. CARSON, [1980] J.S. W.L. 343. And see OGUS and BARENDT, supra, note 27, ch. 12. 
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pension or allowance, supplementary benefit by way of a single payment to 
meet an exceptional need. "" 
The regulations themselves prescribe at length and in great detail when a 
need is to be regarded as existing, which claimants are eligible, matters for 
which no payment may be made (e.g. school uniform, telephone charges, 
television and radio, holidays, costs or expenses consequent upon an 
appearance in court) and those matters for which payments may be made if 
stated conditions are satisfied (e.g. clothing and fuel costs, funeral expenses, 
furniture and household equipment, removal expenses, essential redecoration, 
costs of taking a job, voluntary repatriation expenses).102 
In a similar manner, there was formerly power where there were 
exceptional circumstances to make weekly payments additional to the 
normal scale rates "as may be appropriate to take account of those 
circumstances" 103. There is now a set of regulations specifying when 
increased weekly payments may be made, such as for extra heating and 
dietary costs. The permitted amounts are often specified exactly and there is 
no power to make increased weekly payments for requirements that are not 
stated in the regulations.104 
Some other changes related to decision-making were also made in 1980. 
First, the Supplementary Benefits Commission was abolished. Responsibility 
for use of what are now wide powers of making regulations was vested 
directly in the ministers responsible for the DHSS, subject only to consult-
ation with the Social Security Advisory Committee 105. Second, decisions on 
claims for benefit were after 1980 to be made not in the name of the 
Commission but by DHSS officials designated as "benefit officers" on the 
insurance officer model. In one sense, the appeal tribunals survived virtually 
intact but their powers were cut back in the following way. The power which 
they had before November 1980 to take any decision on an appeal which the 
Commission could have taken (bound only by the skeletonic provisions of 
the 1976 Act) was transmuted into a power to take any decision on an 
appeal which a benefit officer could have taken 106. Thus tribunals, like the 
benefit officers, had thereafter to take decisions in accordance with the 
amended Act and the detailed regulations. Third, the short-lived appeal on 
law from these tribunals to the superior courts gave way in 1980 to an appeal 
101. Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, s. 3(1) as amended by Social Security Act 1980. 
102. Supplementary Benefit (Single Payment) Regulations 1981, S.I. 1981/1528. 
103. Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, sch. 1, para. 4(1). 
104. See now Supplementary Benefit (Requirements) Regulations 1983, S.I. 1983/1399, Part III. 
105. Supplementary Benefits Act 1980, ss. 9, 10. 
106. Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, s. 15(3), as amended in 1980. 
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on law to the Social Security Commissioners, but the leave of a Commissioner 
is needed for such an appeal.107 
In consequence, these tribunals could no longer range with freedom in 
the area of policy and discretion. Their task after November 1980 was to 
decide whether regulations had been correctly applied, after giving the 
claimant an opportunity to submit evidence and to argue that a different 
decision should have been made. In these circumstances, the scope of 
tribunal discretion was determined by the regulations. Before 1980, many 
tribunals were more at ease in responding to arguments based on hardship 
that sought to show that the claimant deserved extra help from the tribunal, 
than in dealing with more legal arguments based on the interpretation of 
statute and on case-law. When a tribunal was persuaded that a claimant 
deserved extra assistance, a suitable discretionary power was usually avail-
able. After 1980, such tribunals had much less scope for giving expression to 
their own perceptions of need. Instead tribunal work called for greater 
technical ability in dealing with arguments based on entitlement under 
regulations. Since their decisions could be appealed on law to the Social 
Security Commissioners, there was extra pressure on the tribunals to make 
an adequate record of the proceedings and the decision. Moreover the 
arguments which a skilled representative could use had changed, since after 
1980 it would often be pointless to direct a plea for help to the residual 
discretion of the tribunal, if indeed such discretion had survived. 
It will be evident from these considerations that the role of SBATs 
changed in 1980 to become much closer to that of the national insurance 
local tribunals. This change, together with the concomitant need for greater 
legal expertise, was a major factor in establishing the case for integration of 
the two sorts of tribunal, which Professor Bell had in 1975 described as the 
ultimate objective ,os. Before dealing with the integration that occurred in 
1984, I propose first to consider the immediate effects on supplementary 
benefit tribunals of the introduction of an appeal on law to the Social 
Security Commissioners in 1980. 
2.4. Appeals on law to the Social Security Commissioners 
As mentioned above, the introduction of the new legal structure of the 
supplementary benefits scheme in November 1980 was accompanied by the 
provision of an appeal on law from SBATs to the Social Security Commis-
sioners, with leave of a Commissioner. Judicial review of SBAT decisions as 
107. Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, s. 15A, inserted by Social Security Act 1979, s. 6. 
108. BELL, supra, note 68, p. 25. 
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it occurred before 1980 thereby gave way to a new jurisdiction in the 
Commissioners, jurisdiction that was admittedly exercised on legal grounds 
but in a different judicial style and by a very different procedure. No legal aid 
was available for appeals to the Commissioners whereas it had been for 
appeals on law to the High Court, but since lawyers have no exclusive right of 
audience before them, the way was open to welfare rights advisers to take to 
the Commissioners cases that they had already handled before local 
tribunals. Moreover, no liability to legal costs could arise in proceedings 
before the Commissioners. Despite the restrictions on the right of appeal, the 
flow of cases reaching the Commissioners soon became a veritable torrent by 
contrast with the trickle of supplementary benefit cases that had reached the 
courts before 1980. As annex B shows in 1981 the Commissioners dealt with 
310 supplementary benefit appeals; in 1982 the figure rose to 1,497 and in 
1983 to 1,605 l09. One reason for these figures is to be found in the effects of 
the new legal structure of supplementary benefits after 1980. But it is likely 
that the advantages which the Commissioners enjoy, compared with the 
superior courts, as a forum for resolving disputed claims to benefit are 
another reason for the rapid rise in appeals to the Commissioners in 
1981-83. A consequence of the provision of an appeal to the Commissioners 
has been the virtual disappearance of supplementary benefit cases from the 
courts. 
No complete study of Commissioners' decisions in supplementary 
benefits has been undertaken, although expert commentary on them is 
available "°. Between 1981 and 1984, 150 such decisions have been published. 
During 1981-82, the reported decisions gave guidance to tribunals on 
matters of procedure (for example, the hearing of witnesses) and the scope of 
matters that can be considered on an appeal l u . A recurrent theme was the 
necessity for an adequate record of findings of fact and reasons for 
decision l l2 ; failure in this respect amounts to an error of law "3. Tribunals 
were found to make elementary errors in applying the Act, for example 
reaching decisions without any evidence to support them "4, deciding the 
109. These figures include the cases in which Commissioners refused leave to appeal. 
110. In journals such as the Journal of Social Welfare Law. And see J. MESHER, Supplementary 
Benefit and Family Income Supplement : the Legislation, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1984, 
for detailed annotation of the legislation. 
111. R(SB) 1/81, 5/82, 6/82; and R(SB) 9/81, 14/82. 
112. R(SB) 6/81, 16/81, 19/81, 4/82, 13/82, 23/82, cf. 5/81 (Commissioner assumed tribunal 
familiar with Act). 
113. R(SB) 11/82. 
114. R(SB) 3/81, 5/82, 11/82. 
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status of a claimant as a householder without any reference to the lease 
under which he had possession115 and making extra payments to non-
householders in the erroneous belief that three statutory conditions for these 
payments were alternative and not cumulative116. The Commissioners 
frequently drew attention to the complexity of the regulations117 and 
clarified difficult points of interpretation "8. The largest group of reported 
decisions in 1981 and 1982 concerned the making of single payments where, 
as we have seen, detailed regulations took the place of what before 1980 had 
been a wide and easily exercised discretion. In one decision, where the 
tribunal had made an award totalling £ 13.60 for certain items of underwear 
for a woman who had a disability which caused heavy wear and tear of some 
of these items but not others, the Commissioner allowed items costing £ 3.60 
to stand but remitted the other items to a tribunal for further consider-
ation "9. Where an unemployed man with four children needed £ 12.50 for a 
pair of boots, the tribunal allowed the claim, on the basis that he had already 
spent money on clothing for his children which could have been the subject 
of a special grant ; but the Commissioner found that the tribunal had 
misapplied the regulations and remitted the case with detailed directions as 
to how it should be dealt with. He commented that before 1980, the single 
payment in question would have been within the discretion of the tri-
bunal, "untrammelled by any such detailed code as is now constituted by 
regulations".120 
Decisions such as these make depressing reading, and they illustrate the 
depths that are plumbed when techniques of legalization are applied to an 
unreasonable degree in an area where they are inappropriate. The Commis-
sioners have little choice in interpreting their role as requiring them to decide 
whether the regulations have been correctly applied ; and their interpretation 
is sometimes more favourable to the claimant than was the benefit officer's 
(for example, in deciding when new wallpaper for an elderly and crippled 
widow's living room may be regarded as "essential") m . But from the 
decisions reported in 1981 and 1982 an inescapable conclusion is that one of 
the Commissioners' functions is to curb the desire of some tribunals to make 
single payments in deserving cases, and thus to reinforce the fundamental 
policy changes made in 1980. In particular, tribunals have been checked for 
115. R(SB) 13/82. 
116. R(SB)4/81, 11/81, 16/81. 
117. R(SB) 7/81, 2/82, 19/82. 
118. R(SB) 12/82, 16/82, 19/82. 
119. R(SB)6/81. 
120. R(SB)7/82. 
121. R(SB) 10/81. 
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being too ready to make awards under regulation 30 of the regulations on 
single payments. This regulation is entitled "Discretionary payments" and it 
provides for single payments to be made where there is an exceptional need 
which cannot be met under other regulations, and where a single payment is 
in the opinion of a benefit officer, "the only means by which serious damage, 
or serious risk to the health or safety of any member of the assessment unit 
may be prevented" 122. An early decision by one Commissioner stated that, 
since this regulation made discretionary provisions for exceptional need 
when the consequences of deprivation were liable to be serious for the 
claimant, the regulation should be broadly construed and the exercise of 
discretion by the local tribunal should not be lightly disturbed m . But a later 
decision examined the wording of regulation 30, finding that the conditions 
for payment were strictly defined and allowed "no innate discretion" to 
award payment ; in the Commissioner's view, the title of the regulation was 
misleading since the conditions allowed no scope for the exercise of 
discretion "in the legal sense of the word".124 
In 1976, when advocating the need for a new supplementary benefit 
code to contain a full statement of the rules and policies then employed in 
the administration of benefits, I argued that such a code should not totally 
exclude the exercise of a residual discretion in individual cases l25. In the light 
of the regulations that were first made in 1980 and the published decisions of 
the Commissioners, it is evident that the system has not retained such a 
residual discretion. It may be argued that the grid of rules promulgated in 
the regulations has become too fine a mesh to serve the broader interests of 
justice. There are many reasons why this situation has come about, one being 
the reluctance of those responsible for supplementary benefit expenditure to 
permit judicial bodies, including the Social Security Commissioners, to be a 
rival source of policy 126. Although this function was denied the Commis-
sioners, they nonetheless are able to set important procedural standards for 
decision-making on supplementary benefit claims ; and their powers serve to 
prevent erosion of the principle of legality which was so heavily emphasised 
in the reform of the supplementary benefits scheme in 1980. 
122. S.I. 1981/1528, supra, note 102, regn. 30. The decisions include R(SB) 2/81, 13/81, 3/82, 
8/82, 9/82, cf. 5/81. 
123. R(SB) 13/81. 
124. R(SB)9/82. 
125. BRADLEY, supra, note 67, p. 119. 
126. See supra, note 97. 
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3. The present structure of social security adjudication in Britain 
Earlier sections of this article described separately adjudication under 
the Social Security Act 1975 and the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976. It was 
shown in the introduction that the separate historical origins of this dual 
system were reinforced by Beveridge's emphasis on the distinction between 
social insurance and social assistance. More recent developments (in parti-
cular stemming from 1966, when the concept of entitlement to social 
assistance was introduced tentatively into the legislation) tended to bring the 
two systems closer together. 
In the mid-1970s, when supplementary benefit tribunals were being 
strongly criticised, proposals were made for integrating the two systems of 
adjudication l27. The DHSS came in time to accept that the answer to the 
criticisms was to subject the tribunals to a greater measure of legalization. 
This was consistent with a general shift of opinion in favour of legal rights 
and entitlement and away from administrative discretion as the basis for 
conferring means-tested benefit. The change in the legal structure of the 
supplementary benefit scheme that occurred in 1980 meant, as we have seen, 
a significant change in the role of the appeal tribunals. 
In 1981, responsibility for supplementary benefit tribunal policy was 
transferred from the supplementary benefits division of DHSS to the 
adjudication section of the same department, that was already concerned 
with the functioning of all other social security tribunals. As a result of a 
review into the structure of adjudication, the government decided to 
integrate supplementary benefit and national insurance tribunals and to 
place the integrated tribunals under a presidential system. Thereafter this 
decision was implemented by an Act in 1983 128 which made numerous 
amendments to the earlier legislation, notably the Social Security Act 1975 
and the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976. The effect of these changes was to 
create a three-tier structure modelled on that described in section 1. above, 
but with changes in nomenclature. The new structure came into being in 
April 1984.129 
3.1. The present structure in outline 
(a) Decisions at first instance are made by an adjudication officer, who 
replaces the insurance officer, under the Social Security Act 1975, the benefit 
127. See BELL, supra, note 68 ; and H. CALVERT, in ADLER and BRADLEY, supra, note 26, ch. 14. 
128. Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983 (hereafter : the Act of 
1983), s. 25 and sch. 8. 
129. Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act (Commencement No. 3) 
Order 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 276. 
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officer under the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976 (as amended in 1980) and 
the supplement officer under the Family Incomes Supplement Act 1970 (as 
amended in 1980). Adjudication officers are civil servants within the DHSS 
and the Department of Employment, appointed by the Secretary of State for 
the Social Services to perform the functions of adjudication officers under 
any statute, or such of their functions as may be specified at their 
appointment '30. Appointments are in practice made by the wholesale 
designation of certain grades of officer131. The Secretary of State also 
appoints a Chief Adjudication Officer, who must advise adjudication 
officers on the performance of their functions, keep under review the 
operation of the system, and report annually to the Secretary of State on 
"standards of adjudication" 132. The predecessors of the Chief Adjudication 
Officer (the chief insurance officer and the chief benefit officer) had before 
1984 advised insurance and benefit officers on the making of their decisions 
on a non-statutory basis. Such general guidance as has been given about 
supplementary benefit decisions is contained in what is known as the 
S-manual, which since 1983 has been made publicly available 133. In two 
loose-leaf volumes, it contains a full code of guidance about the law and its 
interpretation, as well as a detailed manual of office procedures. 
While in law an adjudication officer could be authorised to take 
decisions over the whole range of social security benefits, in practice 
different adjudication officers are assigned to deal with particular classes of 
claim. This permits complete administrative flexibility. Thus the decision on 
some benefits may be taken centrally (for example, child benefit) and on 
other benefits in regional or local offices. These "integrated" arrangements 
have meant the end of the former requirement that on some matters (for 
example, whether a claimant for supplementary benefit was available for 
employment) the question had to be referred to an insurance officer for a 
decision 134. In practice there will still be a need for reference of certain 
matters from one class of adjudication officer to another, since the single 
designation of "adjudication officer" has not done away with the division of 
labour in a massive and complex administrative scheme. 
(b) From decisions of an adjudication officer, a right of appeal lies to 
the second tier of the three-tier structure, the social security appeal tribunal 
130. Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(1)(1A) as substituted by the Act of 1983, sch. 8. 
131. See infra, note 133. 
132. Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(1B)-(1E), substituted by the Act of 1983, sch. 8. 
133. Supplementary Benefits Procedure Manual : Guidance for Supplementary Benefit Officers 
and Procedural Instructions, DHSS, 1983. 
134. See now Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 69. On 
the earlier position, see R(SB) 22/83. 
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(hexeafter SSAT), which is the successor of both the national insurance local 
tribunals and the supplementary benefit appeal tribunals. Like those 
tribunals, an SSAT will consist of a chairman and two other persons 135 but 
detailed changes have been made in the composition and functions of the 
tribunals. First, no-one may be appointed to the panel of chairmen by the 
Lord Chancellor (or in Scotland by the Lord President of the Court of 
Session) unless he or she is a barrister, advocate or solicitor of not less than 
five years' standing ,36. Second, in place of the former rules requiring the two 
lay members to be selected from two separate panels, they are now selected 
from a single panel, consisting of persons who appear to the President of 
SSATs to "have knowledge or experience of conditions in the area of the 
tribunal and are representative of persons living or working in the area".137 
Third, SSATs have been brought within a presidential system. The 
office of President of Social Security Appeal Tribunals and Medical Appeal 
Tribunals was created in 1983. The statutory qualification for appointment 
to this post is to be a barrister, advocate or solicitor of at least ten years' 
standing 138, and the first President is Judge John Byrt, Q.C. The President's 
duties include the administration of all SSATs, a task of some complexity 
which, in respect of the former local tribunals, was previously undertaken by 
the DHSS. The President does not appoint the chairmen of these tribunals, 
but he does assign chairmen to sit on particular tribunals and as already 
mentioned he appoints the panel of lay members for each tribunal. He also 
appoints clerks to serve each tribunal. He must arrange for meetings and 
training of chairmen and members of the tribunals, and ensure that 
appropriate works of reference on social security law are available for their 
use 139. In addition to the President, there are appointed regional chairmen of 
the tribunals, to whom the President may devolve many administrative 
tasks, and full-time chairmen of tribunals, this marking a departure from the 
tradition in social security matters that service as chairman is essentially a 
part-time activity. In 1984, there were seven regional chairmen and four 
full-time chairmen in post.140 
(c) The third tier of the adjudication structure continues to be the 
Social Security Commissioners, whose jurisdiction and functioning are not 
directly affected by the changes in the two lower tiers. Indeed, creation of the 
135. Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(2), substituted by the Act of 1983. sch. 8. 
136. Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(2D), (2E), substituted by the Act of 1983, sch. 8. 
137. Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(2A) and sch. 10, para. 2 substituted by the Act of 1983, 
sch. 8 and Health and Social Security Act 1984, s. 16. 
138. Social Security Act 1975, sch. 10, para. 1A(3) inserted by the Act of 1983, sch. 8. 
139. Social Security Act 1975, sch. 10, paras. 1A-1D inserted by the Act of 1983, sch. 8. 
140. Hansard, H.C. Deb., 21 May 1984, col. 784. 
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SSATs has not been accompanied by legislative integration, and rights of 
appeal to the Commissioners from the SSATs are not uniform. As regards 
matters formerly within the jurisdiction of the national insurance local 
tribunals, there is still an unlimited right of appeal where the SSAT's 
decision is by a majority ; but leave to appeal from either the SSAT chairman 
or a Commissioner is required where, as is usually the case, the SSAT's 
decision is unanimous 141. By contrast, as regards matters formerly within the 
jurisdiction of supplementary benefit tribunals, the appeal is confined to 
points of law and may be brought only with leave, given either by an SSAT 
chairman or by a Commissioner 142. There continues to be a right of appeal 
on law from a Commissioner's decision to the Court of Appeal in England 
or to the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland.143 
The 1983 legislation also made changes in the adjudication of medical 
questions. At first instance, decisions of disablement questions may now be 
made by an adjudicating medical practitioner in place of the former medical 
board of two doctors 144. Medical appeal tribunals come within the presi-
dential system just described, and administration of these tribunals has been 
transferred to the new President from the DHSS l45. Appeals to the Social 
Security Commissioners on points of law from the medical appeal tribunals 
are not affected. 
Finally, these various changes have led to the issue of new procedural 
regulations applying to all forms of social security adjudication. The Social 
Security (Adjudication) Regulations 1984 l46 replace a wide variety of proce-
dural rules applying to the different tribunals and also to decisions by the 
Secretary of State and the Attendance Allowance Board 147. These regulations 
include general procedural rules that apply to all tribunals. Thus (a) the 
procedure in connection with a claim or question is to be such as the 
chairman of the tribunal or board shall determine 148 ; (b) any person with a 
right to be heard at a hearing or inquiry "may be accompanied and may be 
replaced by another person whether having professional qualifications or 
not" l49 ; (c) where a person is entitled to be heard at an oral hearing, he or 
141. Social Security Act 1980, s. 15. 
142. Social Security Act 1975, s. 101 applied to supplementary benefit cases by Social Security 
(Adjudication) Regulations 1984, sch. 4, para. 2. 
143. Social Security Act 1980, s. 14. 
144. Social Security Act 1975, s. 108(2) as substituted by Act of 1983, sch. 8, para. 21. 
145. Social Security Act 1975, sch. 12, paras. 5A, 9 inserted by Act of 1983, sch. 8, paras. 9, 10. 
146. S.I. 1984, No. 451. 
147. This Board decides whether the medical conditions for an award of attendance allowance 
are satisfied : Social Security Act 1975, s. 35 and sch. 11. 
148. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 2(l)(a). 
149. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 2(l)(b). 
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his representative may address the tribunal, may give evidence, may call 
witnesses and may put questions directly to any other person called as a 
witness '50; (d) oral hearings before adjudicating authorities are in principle 
to be in public although in some circumstances a hearing may be in 
private m ; (e) members of the Council on Tribunals and the Council's 
Scottish Committee may be present at tribunal hearings and deliberations 
even though they are in private.152 
In addition to these general provisions, separate procedural rules are 
laid down for specific tribunals. For the most part, those of the SSATs serve 
to harmonise procedures that formerly differed as between the national 
insurance and supplementary benefit tribunals. Thus the chairman of the 
SSAT may decide that a medical assessor should sit with the tribunal to 
advise on medical issues, a power that did not formerly apply to supple-
mentary benefit appeals 153. It is now the duty of the chairman of the SSAT 
to record the tribunal's decision in writing together with the reasons and the 
findings of fact154 : formerly in supplementary benefit cases this was the duty 
of the whole tribunal. 
Procedure before the Social Security Commissioners is also governed by 
these regulations. In an endeavour to speed up the decision of cases by the 
Commissioners, time-limits now apply for making written observations on 
any application, appeal or reference.155 
3.2. Comment 
It must never be assumed that the best legislative intentions are fulfilled 
in practice. As was said during a debate in the House of Commons about 
delays in the award and payment of social security benefits, "We are in 
danger of assuming that people who have got entitlements get those 
entitlements promptly — or even at all" 156. Changes in the structure of 
welfare adjudication do not necessarily produce practical gains. Thus 
administration of local tribunals by a presidential system may be no more 
150. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 4(8). 
151. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 4(4). The hearing is in public except where in a case before an 
adjudicating authority other than a Social Security Commissioner, the claimant requests a 
private hearing, or where the tribunal chairman or the Commissioner decides that intimate 
personal or financial circumstances may have to be disclosed or that considerations of 
public security are involved. 
152. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regns. 2(2)(a) and 3. 
153. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 18(4). 
154. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 19(2). 
155. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 29. 
156. Hansard, H.C. Deb., 29 Jul. 1982, col. 1389. 
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efficient than administration by the DHSS. Nonetheless, as shown above, 
earlier developments in the social security system prepared the way for the 
integration of tribunals 157, and there was no opposition in Parliament to the 
basic proposal. But it will take time to achieve a working integration of the 
two previous systems. In law the new tribunals came into being in April 
1984, but extensive training will be needed before the chairmen, members 
and clerks are fully able to deal with both sides of the new jurisdiction. Until 
1989 certain chairmen, that is those chairmen of supplementary benefit 
tribunals who continue in office although not legally qualified, will be 
restricted to hearing supplementary benefit appeals 158. Moreover, procedures 
will need to be created for enabling the integrated adjudication system to 
deal with the questions which had before 1984 to be referred from the 
supplementary benefit side to national insurance tribunals for decision l59. 
Continuing specialization of functions among adjudication officers will be 
inevitable. A civil servant with great experience of deciding claims for 
additional payments for hearing or clothing cannot be expected to command 
similar knowledge of the rules which govern whether a claimant has lost 
employment through a stoppage at his place of work due to a trade dispute, 
or whether a claimant's injury occurred in an industrial accident. Yet the 
local tribunals will in time need to be able to deal with all manner of disputes 
arising out of social security and social assistance, other than those assigned 
to other adjudicating procedures for adjudication. 
One argument advanced by the government for the reforms was that it 
would improve the quality of adjudication. The issue of how within an 
adjudicative system one can measure and promote the quality of decisions 
has been more fully explored in American literature than in Great Britain 160. 
Three features of the recent British reforms may be said to promote the 
quality of decisions : (a) the requirement of legally qualified chairmen ; (b) the 
merger of the tribunals dealing with means-tested and non-means tested 
benefit ; and (c) the creation of the presidential system. As regards (a), the 
requirement that all chairmen of SSATs appointed in future must be 
solicitors or barristers of five years' standing is not in itself a sufficient test of 
suitability. The professional qualification and the rule of standing will not 
ensure knowledge or professional experience of social security law. Still less 
157. Supra, note 127. Andsee L. PLIATZKY, Report on Non-Departmental Public Bodies, Cmnd. 
7797, 1980, 81. 
158. S.I. 1984, No. 451, regn. 93. 
159. Supra, note 134. 
160. See e.g. works cited in note 11, supra. 
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will the rules ensure possession of the personal qualities that a tribunal 
chairman needs.161 
As regards (b), the merger of tribunals should promote the uniform 
treatment of social security and social assistance appeals, and minimize the 
risk of lower standards of adjudication being applied to means-tested 
benefits. 
As regards (c), the presidential system, the national president and 
regional chairmen will be in a position to become actively involved with the 
work of the tribunals through training and conferences, following up 
complaints and giving advice, without meeting the criticism that this activity 
is interfering with the independence of tribunals. Thus the president could (if 
he so wished) instigate a close monitoring of the performance of local 
tribunals, that might resemble American schemes of "quality assurance" 162. 
This is something that the Council on Tribunals in Britain has never been 
able to undertake, despite its broad statutory oversight of all tribunals.163 
Schemes of quality control have yet to be created, but a different step in 
the same direction was taken in 1980 when the Social Security Commissioners 
were given an appellate jurisdiction in supplementary benefit cases. That 
step, coinciding with the change in the legal nature of the supplementary 
benefit scheme, made it necessary for local tribunals to acquire greater 
expertise in conducting hearings, in performing an inquisitorial role without 
breaching natural justice 164, in dealing with submissions by the parties, and 
in formulating and justifying their decisions. Since the role of the clerk had 
by then been down-graded, so that a tribunal could no longer look to the 
clerk for advice on the rules of supplementary benefit165, the necessary 
expertise had to come from within the tribunal. If it is argued that lawyers do 
not have a monopoly of common sense and good judgment166, the reply — 
reminiscent of the reply which Sir Edward Coke gave to the same argument 
when it was advanced by James I of England in 1607 167 — is that a tribunal's 
161. See also J. MESHER, "The Merging of Social Security Tribunals", (1983) 10 Br. J. of Law 
and Society 135, p. 138-139. In Mesher's view, the necessity for lawyer chairmen outweighs 
any disadvantages there may be. 
162. J.L. MASHAW, "The Management Side of Due Process", supra, note 11 ; J.L. MASHAW, 
Bureaucratic Justice, supra, note 11, ch. 7. 
163. Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, s. 1(1). See also The Functions of the Council on Tribunals, 
Cmnd. 7805, 1980, p. 17-20. 
164. R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex p. Moore, [1965] 1 Q.B. 456; Commis-
sioners' Decisions R(SB) 2/83 and R(SB) 30/84. 
165. On the role of the clerk, see R(SB) 13/83. 
166. E.g. Hansard, H.C. Deb., 17 Feb. 1983, col. 551. 
167. Case of Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 12Co. Rep. 63. 
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decision on supplementary benefit appeals can no longer be based on 
common sense and good judgment of what the claimant needs. We saw 
above that Beveridge characterised decision on claims for social assistance as 
requiring "sympathetic justice and discretion taking full account of individual 
circumstances" 168. The justice that needy claimants now receive can be no 
more sympathetic than the regulations allow ; and many individual cir-
cumstances that are relevant to the claimant's social situation are legally 
irrelevant to the tribunal's proceedings. 
We may suppose that, for the DHSS ministers who decide government 
policy towards the poor and express it through regulations, what matters is 
that appeal tribunals should be able to make decisions that faithfully apply 
the regulations and which stand up to scrutiny on legal grounds by the Social 
Security Commissioners. The greater the legal competence of local tribunals, 
the less the need for claimants and adjudication officers to appeal to the 
Commissioners. As one minister said in Parliament, the requirement of legal 
chairmen "is almost a necessity to improve the tribunal's chances of coming 
to a sound decision" 169. Quality thus becomes indistinguishable from legal 
expertise. 
Another argument advanced in favour of the recent changes was that 
they would promote the independence of the tribunals ; in particular, that the 
presidential system would set the tribunals at a greater distance from the 
DHSS. For similar reasons, administrative responsibility for the Social 
Security Commissioners has recently been transferred from the DHSS to the 
Lord Chancellor's Department, which is responsible for the judicial system 
and the ordinary courts 17°. Now judicial independence is a jewel with many 
facets, and even the Social Security Commissioners recently departed from 
due even-handedness of justice when they gave priority to appeals brought to 
them by benefit officers and made private appellants wait m . That social 
security tribunals should be perceived as deciding appeals independently of 
the DHSS is fundamental to their role. But in social security the scope for 
decision-making depends to a great extent on the enacted legislation. 
Greater independence for the tribunals does not mean that their decisions 
168. Supra, note 25. 
169. House of Commons Standing Committee B, 21 April 1983, col. 637. 
170. Transfer of Functions (Social Security Commissioners) Order 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 1818. 
171. The Commissioners responded to a rising torrent of supplementary benefits appeals in 
1981 by deciding to give priority to appeals brought by benefit officers which they 
considered likely to raise points of law of general importance, whereas appeals brought by 
claimants were more likely to raise issues applicable to a claimant's individual cir-
cumstances. Hansard, 18 Jan. 1982, col. 48 (W.A.); and Legal Action Group Bulletin, 
March 1982, 7; May 1982, 8. 
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can be more favourable to the claimant than the enacted law permits. In fact, 
as the formal independence of the tribunals has been fostered, the rule-
making powers of the DHSS have also increased. The statutory process of 
consultation with the Social Security Advisory Committee "2 and parlia-
mentary scrutiny is rarely able to deflect the government from its chosen 
course of action. While the Social Security Commissioners exercise a 
measure of legal review over the validity of regulations, they rarely find it 
necessary to hold a regulation invalid, and such a decision is likely to lead 
the DHSS to make the regulation over again 173. In a similar way, decisions 
by Social Security Commissioners interpreting the regulations in a manner 
contrary to the official view are liable to cause the DHSS to have recourse to 
amending regulations.174 
Simplicity has also been advanced in support of the reforms. It makes 
for simpler public explanation to have a standard appeal to a local tribunal 
from most first instance decisions l75, but the rules of procedure made in 
1984 are little easier to understand than the mass of substantive regulations 
governing the award of benefit, and the recent reforms do not, as will be 
discussed below, reduce the need for most appellants to have expert help. 
Similarly, while ministers expressed a modest hope that the reforms would 
improve the speed with which decisions are taken l76, this is not a necessary 
consequence. If undue delays do occur, however, responsibility for the 
delays will be focussed more clearly than in the past, on the Chief 
Adjudication Officer so far as first instance decisions are concerned, and on 
the President of SSATs and Medical Appeal Tribunals in respect of second-
tier delays. It may be hoped, for reasons already discussed, that the President 
may be able to tackle delays by local tribunals more vigorously than the 
DHSS could have done. However, while the delays that seem inherent in a 
system of appeals are rightly unpopular with appellants and their M.P.s.177, 
172. Social Security Act 1980, ss. 9, 10. 
173. An important example is R(SB) 26/84, where part of the consolidated Supplementary 
Benefit (Single Payments) Regulations 1981 was held ultra vires on procedural grounds, 
since it sought to change the law and thus fell outside the procedure for consolidating 
regulations. 
174. Sometimes this power is used because of the public expenditure implications of a 
Commissioner's decision : thus R(S) 7/78 led immediately to a tightening in the eligibility 
of housewives for non-contributory invalidity pension (S.I. 1978, No. 1340) and R(SB) 
52/83 led to an exclusion of medical needs from single payments of supplementary benefit 
(S.I. 1983, No. 1630). But the power may be used to extend the scope of benefit after 
Commissioners' decisions interpreting regulations restrictively (e.g. R(SB) 2/82, 5/83 and 
26/83). 
175. See DHSS leaflet How to appeal, N.I. 246 (May 1983). 
176. Hansard, H.C. Deb., 17 Feb. 1983, col. 497. 
177. See e.g. Hansard, H.C. Deb., 17 Feb. 1983, cols. 543, 555; H.C. Standing Committee B, 
21 Apr. 1983, col. 678 ; H.C. Deb., 21 May 1984, cols. 777, 780. 
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it is not always certain which stages in the appeals process in fact cause 
delay ; this information is needed before it can be known whether any 
sacrifice of procedural rights would reduce the risks of delay. 
Nor is it known whether structural change and a stress on formal 
independence materially affect how tribunal members perceive their role, or 
influence their decision-making. Of the reforms under discussion, the change 
that proved most controversial in Parliament was the re-constitution of the 
panels from which tribunal members are selected. Before 1984, one of the 
two lay members of a national insurance local tribunal was required to be 
drawn from a panel representing employers and self-employed earners, and 
the other from a panel representing employed earners m. The long-established 
practice by which the panels of employed earners were appointed was that 
the DHSS sought nominations from local Trades Councils (i.e. local 
federations to which trade union branches affiliate). To include in every local 
tribunal one member representative of employers and one representative of 
employed workers was appropriate when most cases coming before a 
tribunal were likely to arise out of employment disputes. Despite their 
different antecedents, supplementary benefit tribunals had come to have a 
similar composition, with one member being appointed from persons 
"appearing to have knowledge or experience of conditions in the area... and 
of the problems of people living on low incomes", and the second member 
being appointed from a panel of those "appearing to represent work-
people" 179 ; the latter panel was chosen from nominations submitted by local 
Trades Councils. In 1983, the government wished to substitute for these two 
panels a single panel appointed by the President of SSATs from persons 
appearing "to have knowledge or experience of conditions in the area and to 
be representative of persons living or working in the area" 18°. The govern-
ment argued that this would enable nominations to be made by a wide range 
of voluntary organizations and community groups (for example, disability 
and single-parent support groups) and that many social security disputes no 
longer arose out of the employment context. 
Strong resistance to this came from the Labour opposition in Parliament, 
who insisted that the change be taken out of the Bill of 1983, when its 
passage through Parliament was cut short by the general election in May 
1983. Thereafter, the government returned to the matter and in 1984 a single 
panel of members was established on the lines first proposed in 1983. In vain 
did the opposition argue that the requirement of a trade union nominee was 
178. Social Security Act 1975 s. 97(2), before amendment in 1983. 
179. Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, sch. 4, para. 1, before amendment in 1983. 
180. See now Social Security Act 1975, s. 97(2A) and sch. 10, para. 2, amended by Health and 
Social Security Act 1984, s. 16. 
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essential to ensure that ordinary appellants could identify with at least one 
member of the tribunal181. The Council on Tribunals welcomed the change 
to a single panell82. While there was indeed an argument to be made for 
broadening the basis of tribunal membership, there was considerable force in 
an opposition proposal that would have spelled out in detail the President's 
obligations in making appointments to the panels m . When the new system 
came into force, the members of the existing panels were transferred en bloc 
to the new single panel, and it is likely that the President of SSATs will 
continue to make use of existing forms of consultation. In Scotland, he is to 
continue to seek nominations from the Scottish Trades Union Congress and 
plans to appoint half of the panel from those nominated by that body.184 
While the recent reforms sought to increase the legal expertise of the 
tribunals, they did not include steps to increase the availability of skilled 
representation or expert advice for appellants. The legal aid scheme does not 
extend to representation before social security tribunals, even in respect of 
appeals to the Social Security Commissioners on points of law, although 
preliminary advice or assistance (for example, the drafting of a letter of 
appeal) is available under the present legal advice schemel85. In the 
legislative debates, M.P.s. frequently referred to the anxiety, helplessness and 
lack of comprehension which many claimants feel about the tribunal 
process. The latest statistics on representation before supplementary benefit 
tribunals (equivalent statistics for national insurance tribunals were not 
published) appear in annex C. From table I it will be seen that the greatest 
measure of success, 35%, was secured (in just on one-quarter of all appeals), 
when the appellant both attended and was accompanied or represented at 
the appeal hearing. The lowest measure of success, 7 %, was recorded (in the 
largest group of cases, 37%) when the appellant neither attended nor was 
represented. Information about the relative success achieved by different 
forms of representation is summarised in table II. The high success-rate of 
social workers as representatives suggests strongly that even under a scheme 
based on statutory entitlements, legal advocacy is not essential for success. 
At present government policies on the funding of law centres and the future 
181. See Hansard, H.C. Deb., Standing Committee A, 6 Mar. 1984, col. 466 ff; H.C. Deb., 
2 May 1984, col. 498 ff ; H.L. Deb., 21 June 1984, col. 548 ff. and 3 July 1984, col. 214 ff. 
182. Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1983-84, p. 22. 
183. See Hansard, H.C. Deb., 2 May 1984, col. 498. 
184. Newsletter from regional chairman (Scotland) of SSATs and medical appeal tribunals, 
Feb. 1985. Since the former panels are now merged into one, and the clerk summons 
members in rotation, a tribunal may now include two former employers' nominees, or two 
former union nominees, in addition to the chairman. 
185. Legal Aid Act 1974, part 1. 
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of legal aid are uncertain l86. Since the proclaimed interest of the government 
lies in encouraging self-help in presenting appeals, the governement does not 
accept that the legalization of social security adjudication has reached a 
point where legal representation has become a virtual necessity for an 
appellant to have any chance of success 187, and annex C gives support to this 
position. However, while the government has paid lip-service to the proposi-
tion that appellants should be enabled to conduct their own cases whenever 
possible, it has not yet provided resources to the Council on Tribunals to 
review tribunal procedures for this purpose.188 
The reforms of 1983-84 were extensive but did not amount to a 
comprehensive re-making of social security adjudication. The changes which 
the 1983 Act made in medical adjudication have already been described. In 
1985 other aspects of medical adjudication were under review, in particular 
the procedures of the Attendance Allowance Board, which have attracted 
much parliamentary criticism. A senior opposition M.P., who wished to see 
attendance allowance decisions entrusted to the new SSATs, described the 
Board's procedures as an "undisguised shambles", "the ultimate in irres-
ponsibility, in sheltered decisions and in injustice to the claimants" 189. 
Criticism has focussed on the undue delays in decisions, and on the fact that 
there is no right of appeal against refusal of the allowance, although review 
by the Board of earlier decisions does occur. Another benefit for disabled 
persons that has been criticised is the mobility allowance, the medical 
conditions for which are decided by the medical authorities who decide 
industrial disablement questions.190 
In 1983 a review of attendance allowance and mobility allowance 
procedures was undertaken for the DHSS by Mr. P.R. Oglesby '" . His 
report examined the extent to which a claimant's own doctor should provide 
the medical assessment on which the award of benefit is based, and the need 
for medical expertise in the adjudication process. Oglesby proposed that the 
right of appeal against a refusal of benefit should be to a social security 
appeal tribunal, consisting for mobility allowance appeals of the legal 
186. See 34lh Report of the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Aid, H.C. 151 
(1983-84). 
187. A notable exchange on the need for representation at social security tribunals is recorded 
in H.C. Deb., Standing Committee B, 21 April 1983, cols. 657-664. 
188. Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1983-84, p. 9. And see Cmnd. 9077, 1983. 
189. H.C. Deb., Standing Committee B, 21 April 1983, col. 696. See also H.L. Deb., 16 Dec. 
1982, col. 725. 
190. Social Security Act 1975, s. 37A (inserted by Social Security Pensions Act 1975, s. 22(1) ) 
and the Mobility Allowance Regulations 1975, S.I. No. 1573. 
191. And see Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1983-84, p. 23. 
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chairman, a doctor and one lay person ; and, for attendance allowance 
appeals, of the legal chairman, a doctor and an experienced nurse. Such a 
proposal would alter the character of the SSAT from being a generalized 
tribunal for all aspects of social security into a more specialized tribunal for 
some purposes. This in turn raises the broader question of whether for other 
appeals that may turn on matters of medical judgment but are not within the 
jurisdiction of the medical appeal tribunal, the SSAT should regularly 
include a doctor instead of basing its decision on written medical evidence 
(which happens frequently), and in a difficult case calling on a medical 
assessor for advice (which happens much less frequently). A related question 
is whether the Social Security Commissioners should be authorised to sit 
with a doctor in cases involving difficult medical issues. In this respect, the 
experience of the Commission des affaires sociales in Quebec, the body which 
in Canada corresponds most closely with the Social Security Commissioners 
in Britain, is directly relevant. 
An area of welfare which falls completely outside the present structure 
of social security appeals is that of housing benefit. This benefit was 
introduced in 1982 to replace a variety of earlier benefits and allowances, 
including the housing element of supplementary benefit. Housing benefit is 
administered by local housing authorities, not by the DHSS, and the only 
right of appeal is to a housing benefit review board appointed by the local 
authority 192. This board lacks some essential qualities of a tribunal, and has 
not been placed under the supervision of the Council on Tribunals. Nothing 
seems to have gone right with the introduction of housing benefit193, and 
there is every reason why rights of appeal against adverse decisions on 
housing benefit should be fully comparable with rights of appeal against 
social security decisions — both directly determine the incomes of many 
needy families 194. In 1985, these matters were under review by the govern-
ment, along with the housing benefit scheme itself. 
Conclusion 
The improvement of an adjudication system is inevitably a never-ending 
process, as new demands are placed upon it and perceptions of the system 
change. The immediate priority for the appeals system in Britain is for the 
integration of appeals at local level to be fully realized, and the benefits of 
the presidential system obtained. Once that has been achieved, it would be 
192. Housing Benefits Regulations 1982, S.I. 1982, No. 1124, part VIII. 
193. See the reports cited in note 7, supra. 
194. Hansard, U.C. Deb., 17 Feb. 1983, col. 556 and H.C. Deb., Standing Committee B, 
26 April 1983, col. 711 ff. 
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possible to devise further refinements in the system (possibly on the lines 
recommended by Mr. Oglesby) and to add housing benefit to the jurisdiction 
of SSATs. At present it would be premature to attempt such further changes. 
A dominant theme in the recent reforms has been the need to improve 
the legal capability of local tribunals, in response to the greater legal 
complexity of the social security scheme. However, for two reasons the 
contribution of legality is not an answer to all the stresses and strains that are 
imposed on the social security system. 
First, what may be a satisfactory process judged by narrowly legal 
standards may not be satisfactory from other viewpoints. Thus the adverse 
effects of delay are worse for the claimant than for those operating the 
system, even if a decision eventually emerges that bears legal scrutiny. Again, 
a tribunal may handle an appeal correctly but score low marks in terms of 
human relations. As was said in the House of Commons, "We want a 
responsive, sympathetic tribunal which through its composition will have 
some knowledge of the problems the poor appellant has to face" 195. The 
need for response and sympathy does not arise merely from the fact that 
many appellants for social security are poorer than most tribunal members. 
It also arises from the vulnerability of the unrepresented individual at a 
tribunal hearing, compared with the tribunal members, the adjudication 
officer and others who regularly take part in tribunal proceedings. 
Second, the more that legal efficiency is achieved, the more accurately 
will the government's social policies as expressed in legislation be applied in 
decisions affecting the individual. Adjudication by tribunals as they now are 
in Britain can play a positive part in determining what claimants are entitled 
to, and in enabling them to receive that entitlement. But scope for using the 
courts and tribunals in Britain as a surrogate political process is very limited 
in present circumstances 196. Only a redeployment of economic resources and 
a determined political commitment are capable of making significant 
improvements in the state's social policies.197 
195. H.C. Deb., Standing Committee B, 19 Apr. 1983, col. 619. 
196. Cf. T. PROSSER, Test Cases for the Poor, London, Child Poverty Action Group, 1983. 
197. To repeat the conclusion I reached in (1976) 27 N.I.L.Q. 96, p. 119. An earlier version of 
the present article was read in 1983 by Professor P. Issalys and by Mr. J.G. Mitchell Q.C. I 
wish to record my thanks for their comments and also for help given by Mr. R.W. Deans, 
C.B. 
ANNEX A 
Social Security Appeals 1983 
TYPE OF 
BENEFIT 
TOTAL 
CLAIMS 
TOTAL APPEALS 
& REFERENCES 
TO LOCAL TRBL. 
(a) 
DECISIONS 
IN FAVOUR 
OF 
CLAIMANT % 
APPEALS 
TO 
COMMRS. 
DECISIONS 
IN FAVOUR 
OF 
CLAIMANT % 
Unemployment 5.17m new claims 16,449 3,295 20% 314 66 21% 
Sickness 
Invalidity 3.16m new claims (b) 
3,076 
3,371 
592 19% 
984 29% 
81 
164 
25 31% 
46 28% 
Non-contributory 
invalidity 
pension 
Not available 
1,516 555 37% 78 16 21% 
Maternity 
658,000 grants (c) 
330,000 allowances (c) 468 88 19% 14 9 64% 
Death Grant 609,000 grants (c) 41 10 24% 
— — — 
Guardian's 
Allowance etc. 
4,894 (no. of 
children) (d) 49 5 10% 3 1 33% 
Invalid Care 
Allowance 
6,619(3508 
successful) 58 2 3% 2 — — 
Widows 406,000 (d) 216 59 27% 25 3 12% 
Retirement 
Pension 9.28m (d) 900 219 24% 56 12 21% 
Attendance 
Allowance 
207,387(159,491 (e) 
successful) 
144 
29,843 (h) 
25 17% 
19,819 66% 
8 
154 
2 25% 
17 (11%) 
Mobility 
Allowance 
275,628 (d) 255 
3,102 (i) 
8 
1,019 
3% 
33% 
12 
86 
0 
80 93% 
Industrial 
Injury 116,000 763 329 43% 
> 
• 253 98 
Industrial 
Disablement 189,000 (d) 
1,790 
10,425 (') 
729 
4,186 
41% 
40% (39%) 
Industrial 
Death 1,349 (0 60 12 20% 
Child Benefit 12.68m (g) 952 102 11% 32 5 (16%) 
One Parent 
Benefit 508,000 (d) 342 37 11% — — — 
Supplementary 
Benefit 
6.08m 
(4.36m successful) 56,084 (J) 9,386 23% (k) 
1,605 
N.A. 
Family Income 
Supplement 351,270 2,009 Ü) 125 6% N.A. 
(a) National insurance local tribunal, except where otherwise stated. 
(b) In 1983, 672,000 claims for sickness and invalidity were referred to regional medical services. 278,000 medical examinations took place; 201,000 claimants 
were considered incapable of work ; 77,000 claimants were considered capable of normal occupation or alternative work ; 61,000 claimants failed to attend 
for examination ; 14,000 claimants withdrew claim after receiving notice to attend for examination. 
(c) Total awards in 1983. 
(d) Awards in payment on 30th November or 31st December 1983. 
(e) Initial claims. 
(f) Figure for 1982. 
(g) Children in respect of whom benefit was being paid at end of 1982. 
(h) Decisions by Attendance Allowance Board on review. 
(i) Appeals and references to Medical Appeal Tribunal (medical questions), 
(j) Decisions by Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunal, 
(k) As percentage of appeals about right to or amount of any benefit — 41,154. 
[The figures in this annex are all extracted from various tables in Social Security Statistics 1984, H.M.S.O. In some cases the figures refer to 1982 rather than 
1983.] 
448 Les Cahiers de Droit (1985) 26 C. de D. 403 
ANNEX B 
Cases Disposed by National Insurance Local Tribunals, 
Social Security Commissioners and 
Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunals 
1970-1983 (Great Britain) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
National Insurance Social Security Supplementary Benefit 
Year Local Tribunals Commissioners Appeal Tribunals 
1970 35,641 2,576 28,717 
1971 29,334 2,261 29,648 
1972 35,903 2,189 36,051 
1973 29,477 2,039 26,002 
1974 28,510 1,916 27,242 
1975 31,485 1,975 34,042 
1976 37,425 1,853 54,407 
1977 40,403 1,997 63,943 
1978 45,024 1,857 63,943 
1979 39,304 2,751 47,101 
1980 30,098 3,329 50,504 
1981 36,744 3,187 51,229 
1982 34,218 4,523 57,846 
1983 30,468 3,730 62,070 
Source: Annual Reports of Council on Tribunals. The figures in column 3 include appeals on 
law from medical appeal tribunals and the Attendance Allowance Board. The figures 
in column 3 for 1981-83 include the following appeals on law from Supplementary 
Benefit Appeal Tribunals : 1981,310; 1982, 1,497; 1983, 1,605. The figures in column 4 
include appeals concerning Family Income Supplement (1981, 1,365; 1982, 1,762; 
1983, 1,503). 
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ANNEX C 
Representation, attendance and success-rate 
at supplementary benefit appeal tribunals in 1983 
(source : Social Security Statistics 1984) 
Table I shows the number of cases in which the appellant (A) attended the hearing and/or 
was represented, the number in brackets being a percentage of all appeals. The success-rate 
in each category is also shown. 
TABLE I 
A was 
represented 
success 
rate 
A was not 
represented 
success 
rate 
1 
Totals 
r— 
success 
rate 
A 
attended 
14,508 
(24%) 35% 
21,290 
(35%) 21% 
35,798 
(59%) 27% 
A did not 
attend 
2,319 
( 4%) 31% 
22,450 
(37%) 7% 
24,769 
(41 %) 9.% 
Totals 16,827 
(28%) 34% 
43,740 
(72%) 14% 
60,567 
(100%) 19.5% 
"Representation" for this purpose does not necessarily mean representation as a lawyer 
would understand it. Thus, if the appellant was accompanied by a friend or relative who took 
an active part in presenting the appeal, this would be shown as representation. "Success" is to 
be understood as referring to those appeals whose outcome was that the earlier award of benefit 
was revised in a manner advantageous to the appellant. 
The main categories of representation and the respective success-rates are shown in Table II. 
TABLE II 
Type of representation number of cases success-rate 
Friend/relative 9,164 25% 
Trade union official 155 32% 
Solicitor 601 40% 
Social worker 3,259 47% 
Child Poverty Action Group 81 42% 
Claimants' Union 707 43% 
Other 2,860 47% 
Total 16,827 34% 
